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Verbal Magic in the Pali Canon

A Study on Protective-chants, Truth-acts, and Vows

Verbal Magic in the Pali Canon: A Study on Protective-chants, Truth-acts, and Vows

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Abstract

The study of magic has long been controversial. Whilst on the surface it would appear to be used as a means of categorising practices that are used to manipulate, predict, or control events, it has historically been associated with negative and sinister motivations. Often compared and contrasted to religious ritual, magic has been seen as being its opposite and its equal. In this thesis I intend to explore the nature of the relationship between magic and religious ritual within Theravāda Buddhism. This will be done by examining the use of verbal and written language within Theravāda practice. In academic discussion on both magic and ritual we see that one of the most common themes is the use of language in such acts. Language is a powerful tool. In my analysis of magic in Theravāda Buddhism I will address two main issues. Firstly, I reject the notion that magic represents a failing or subversion of religion. Secondly, I reject the idea that magic is not found in the Pali Canon. This thesis will demonstrate that there is a rich history of magical acts in the Pali Canon and these acts cater to both worldly and non-worldly aims.

Author’s Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's *Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes* and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: Laura Danielle Frude DATE: 26/08/2019

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Introduction

Although magic has long been the subject of discussion in many academic fields there is no authoritative definition of the term. Instead what is found is an array of varying classifications of what magic is, how it interacts with religion and society at large. This is because the definition of the term is nuanced through cultural, social and individual perspectives. R.R Marett (1914, xxx), a twentieth century ethnologist, puts it rather pointedly when he states that use of the term 'magic' in discussion with religion has been 'liberal to the point of laxity.' This thesis will be investigating whether certain acts found in the Pali Canon, the collection of texts central to Theravāda Buddhism, can be considered both magical and religious.

The definition of magic and its relationship with religion are multifarious and fall under two broad categories. The first category views magic as a point in human development. The second category views magic in terms of how it relates to society. The first category is highly influenced by the works of Tylor (1920) and Frazer (1922) who viewed magic as part of an evolutionary schema that progressed from magic, to religion, to science. Magic was the domain of the uneducated and the unscrupulous. It codified natural laws before the rise of scientific thought. Marett (1914) and Freud (1913) also subscribe to magic as a point in evolution, but maintain that magic and religion arose to deal with emotional and societal needs. The second category looks at how magic serves the community at large. Malinowski (1954) views magic and religion as being able to exist and function at the same time due to the fact that they serve separate purposes. Magic has a pragmatic function, and religion expresses the powerlessness of man. Durkheim ([1912] 1976,p.35) views religion as practices and beliefs which are removed from normative behaviour; it is sacred as opposed to profane. It provides a society with a moral code and creates a community. Magic is also sacred; however it is viewed as separate from religion as it serves individual needs rather than those of the community. Mauss ([1950] 1972,p.24) and Hammond (1970) also share this viewpoint. Hammond (1970, p.1350) argues: 'religion involves the community and establishes a church, but magic concerns and forms only a clientele'. In this model, it is not the desired outcome of an act which defines it as religious or magical, nor is

it the means employed to perform the act but it is the contribution they make to the moral unity of society.

Theories about magic and religion often examine the functions of magical and religious ritual. Ritual as a term can be seen as a category which applied to a vast set of actions and has a number of interpretations. Bell (1997, pp.138-169), for example, outlines six different forms of ritual action. These are: formalism, traditionalism, invariance, rule governance, sacral symbolism, and performance. Stephenson (2015, p.3) views ritual as a metacategory which encompasses religious and non-religious acts that intersect with performance, drama, and culture.

Interpretations of ritual are often framed in a similar way to the definitions of magic and religion but look at what the ritual acts communicate. Functionalists such as Durkheim ([1912] 1976) view religious rituals as actions that communicate moral codes and behaviours for the community. Magical ritual communicates individual desires and behaviours. Likewise, in emotionalist approaches like that of Malinowski (1935), magical rituals were those which could relieve emotional tensions on an individual level. Religious rituals had a lesser function in respects to emotional relief and were primarily used to communicate with the divine. What this thesis will address is whether magic and magical rituals can exist within a Theravāda context.

For the purposes of this thesis, magic will be defined as supernormal acts in which an individual, or group, changes the world around them. These are not changes that are bought about by the intervention of a deity or other non-human agent, but rather changes that are created as a direct result of the act performed. These acts are performed to benefit the individual and those connected to the individual at the moment the act is used.

There is a perception that Buddhism is a rational and almost scientific religion (Lopez: 2008, p.xii). Buddhism is viewed as being something that has logic and is unhindered by ritual or arcane practice. Any practices that appear to be in opposition to this straightforwardness are seen as a later development added to benefit the masses. In the works of Dharmapāla (1965: pp.27, 217, 495) and de Silva (1981, p.23) the use of ritual or even magic is an addition to Theravāda

Buddhist practice that serves the non-monastic members of the community. De Silva (1981, p.23) notes:

> Buddhism denounced all magical practices as tiracchanavijja, lit. animal science. But denunciation alone was not effective to keep the lay public away from resorting to them. A substitute had to be evolved which served the same purpose and function, but which was not objectionable from the Buddhist philosophical standpoint.

There has been, especially since the 1960's, an attempt by scholars to demarcate Buddhism from the other, or non-Buddhist elements. It suggests an attempt to find a historically correct, unified form of Buddhism that has somehow been adapted and corrupted over the course of time.

In the anthropological study of Theravāda Buddhist practice the term magic has been explored in relation to religious practice. Swearer (1978) who was researching in Thailand and Gombrich (1997) who was researching in Sri Lanka note that magical practices reflect worldly concerns and originate from local, non-Buddhist, traditions. This view is also found in the work of Spiro (1970, p.159) who identifies a seeming dichotomy between worldly and non-worldly. He observes that in textual sources magical actions are considered to be worldly and thus less worthy in motivation than non-worldly actions. Spiro (1970, p.159) argues:

> It is in this sense and in this sense only that magic was (and is) devalued in Buddhism: not because it is wrong, not because its ontological basis is false, but simply because it is irrelevant to the Buddhist quest for salvation.

Spiro (1970, p.275) does, classify what he calls 'non-Buddhist' magic. These are forms of magic that 'are "non-Buddhist" only in the sense that they are not legitimized by some scriptural charter'. Magic, in this reading, is not religious because it does not appear in the Pali Canon.

The Pali Canon is often used to evidence this viewpoint of Buddhism as being unconcerned with worldly matters or ritual, and instead focused on internal development and soteriological aims. Lopez (2013), Schopen (1997), and Kieschnick (2003) all note that in Buddhist studies there has been a tendency to conflate textual examples of Buddhism with 'real' or 'authentic' Buddhism. Lopez (2013,

p.77ff) argues that this has been heavily influenced by Burnouf ([1844]2010). Lopez (2013, p.77) states that this created a 'dematerialized Buddhism', a Buddhism that throws great focus on a Buddha and a Buddhism that is spiritually focused and passive. Material and worldly ambitions are seen as being lesser than the soteriological and meditative practices.

Whilst there has been a ready engagement with magic and Theravāda practice in anthropological studies, there has been a more hesitant investigation of magic within the Pali Canon. Blackburn (1999) investigates protective-chants (*paritta*) in the context of Pali texts, but her study is focuses on one narrow form of magical act. The historian Reynolds (2016) notes that the Pali Canon does not provide a clear-cut view of magical practices as being either positive or negative actions. Instead there is a blurring of viewpoints within the Pali Canon. Reynolds (2016, p.339) states that in the Pali Canon the Buddha possesses supra-normal powers (*iddhi*) and yet he rejects assertations that he is a magical being. Reynolds (2016, p339) posits that the Pali Canon presents a framework of legitimate and non-legitimate interactions with magic. The Pali Canon is not a secular text, nor can it be used as the sole basis of knowledge of Theravāda practice. It does, however, provide a starting point to see what practices were deemed important enough to warrant inclusion whilst the canon was being compiled. The differing reception of magical acts in the Pali Canon suggests that there is a more nuanced relationship between magic and religion.

In my analysis of magic in Theravāda Buddhism I will address two main issues. Firstly, I reject the notion that magic represents a failing or subversion of religion, and secondly that magic is not found in the Pali Canon. Many studies that examine the use of magic in Theravāda Buddhism focus on one text, or a small collection of texts.

There is no direct translation of the word 'magic' into Pali. There are a vast number of terms that could be used in this instance. However, I will be focusing on those that I believe demonstrate both magical and religious qualities as this will allow for interesting discussion. Likewise, I have decided to focus on protective-chants (*paritta*), truth utterances (*saccakiriyā*), and vows (*patthanā*) as they are

already the subject of academic debate that I wish to expand upon. This thesis is not meant to provide an exhaustive list of all language-based acts that can be classed as being magical or ritualistic, but instead to prompt debate on the ways in which magic and ritual are used in connection with Theravāda Buddhism.

In this thesis there will be a focus on the Sutta Piṭaka as these texts contain many instances of language-based acts being used as well as explicit teachings about the use of language. There are several factors that will be considered throughout the course of this thesis in order to demonstrate Buddhist perceptions of such views. This will include the motivation, application and mechanisms that enable the practices in question to be efficacious. It will also be important to investigate who can use such practices as this can provide information about the reception of these forms of action. For example, if the Buddha or monks (*bhikkhus*) are portrayed as using particular types of verbal practices it would indicate that it was regarded by the compilers of the texts as a morally acceptable practice. However, if an act was warned against, or associated with undesirable or morally repugnant individuals, it would indicate that it has negative connotations. Where appropriate I will also consider post-canonical sources such as the Milindapañha and the Visuddhimagga as these can provide an insight as to whether there has been a change in perception and performance of magical and ritual acts.

The person performing the verbal-acts must also be investigated. In many of the examples from the Pali Canon we see that the individual who uses such acts are seen to be virtuous or faithful. What, then, needs to be taken into consideration is whether there are trends in the type of virtue or conduct that is associated with these verbal-acts. The use of loving-kindness (*mettā*) for example is often associated with protection from harm in the Pali Canon (A V 342, Khp 3-5, Khp-a 231-2). I will also examine the impact that the accumulation of merit (good *kamma*) has on the success of verbal-acts. In the post-canonical text, the *Milindapañha* (Mil I 119-124) there is an example of a courtesan using truth utterances (*saccakiriyā*). She is described as an evil person and the purpose of the story is to demonstrate that truth utterances are effective when performed by people who hold fast to the truth. I will explore whether the act of telling the truth, good or bad, is a virtuous

action. I will also examine whether there is any evidence to suggest that bad people can perform such acts successfully due to the previous accumulation of merit.

Truth (*sacca*) is an important concept in Indian traditions and is considered to be extremely powerful (Söhnen-Thieme: 1995, 235-6). As the truth is held to be powerful in other Indian traditions, it would be prudent to examine whether this has a similar function within the Pali Canon. It will also be interesting to determine whether it is personal or universal truths that can be used in a successful performance of a verbal-act. Personal truths would be linked to the individual, but universal truths can incorporate the teachings of the Buddha (*dhamma*) and facts about the nature of the universe. I will need to explore the power of the Buddha's teachings by the Buddha himself, and then its repetition by others, to see if there are any differences in efficacy.

The use of magical acts has not been researched in much depth in the context of the Pali Canon. In the study of Theravāda Buddhism there has been a tendency to view magic as something that has been added to placate worldly needs. In this thesis I aim to show that these acts are found in early Theravāda texts (and potentially practice) and are used by a spectrum of Theravāda Buddhists ranging from monks, to householders, and even the Buddha. These acts exist whether they are classified as magical or not. The analysis in this thesis aims to provide evidence that verbal-acts can be used for both worldly outcomes as well as soteriological outcomes. As McDaniel (2011, pp.116-7) notes: "magic might be bad science. It might be inefficient healthcare. However, does it make it bad religion?"

Chapter One: Types of Language

Language has a significant effect on lives. It serves a function in allowing the individual or wider community to express their needs and desires, to establish rules and boundaries, as well as maintaining relationships. Our day-to-day lives are dependent upon the ability to communicate. Likewise, in a religious setting language is important. This can be seen through the use of prayer, chanting, sermons, literature and even spells. However, in religious or magical contexts, words can appear to take on more than their primary communicative function and can have a transformative effect that is not associated with their everyday use. The power that language has is derived through the context of its use: what the intention is, what the speaker hopes to get out of the act, and whether there are further consequences on the listener. This chapter will examine different theories regarding verbal-acts and how they generate desired results.

I will draw on theories about language and how it has been understood to work within religious and potentially magical settings. An area of interest is the work of the philosopher J.L Austin. Austin ([1962] 2009) notes that there are types of language that go beyond the remit of speech for the sake of speech and refers to these as "performatives". Performatives are types of speech that are performed to produce a certain result. The factors that determine the success of performatives have been explored by scholars such as Bach and Harnish (1979), Searle (1989), and Sedgwick (2003). Performatives, through their association with creating change, have been used to examine religious and magical language. Austin's student Searle (1989, p.549) notes that performatives have a "quasi-magical power". Scholars such as Rappaport (1979) and Skorupski (1976) have used Austin's definition of performatives to analyse ritual and magical acts. However, there has been little scholarship on the use of performatives in Theravāda Buddhism. Tambiah (1968) incorporated them into his work on language, however, he does not go far enough to address the reasoning behind using and conflating the terms magic and ritual. Tambiah (1968, p178) notes that 'it is difficult to see where religion ends and magic begins' but does not provide a clear definition of what magic is.

I will also examine Buddhist teachings that concern language. Language and speech are causative acts and, in most instances, will have *kammic* results. Speech has a moral value that is dependent upon intention meaning that all speech has the potential to be transformative in either a positive or negative manner. In the Aṅguttara Nikaya (A III 415) the Buddha states that *kammic* actions are driven by intention (*cetanā*): "It is volition, bhikkhus, that I call *kamma*. For having willed, one acts by body, speech, or mind". The thought process behind any act determines the *kammic* result the act can have. The intention behind the use of verbal-acts is a factor that determines the success or failure of the performed act.

The purpose of this chapter is to show the power of verbal-acts is linked to the way language is used. The efficacy of verbal-acts does not rest in a single element such as the spoken word. Instead verbal-acts rely on a range of factors to be successful. This includes the symbolism of the words, their relation to the truth, and the character and motivations of the individual who is performing the act.

1.1 Performatives and Illocution

Language can be used to transform and manipulate. Emotional, persuasive, or reflective language all have the ability to change minds. Language can also be used to transform the environment around the individual. It is this second form of verbal-act that I will be focusing on. This type of powerful language is often described under the categories of prayer, chant, spell, and charm. In their definitions we see them linked to religious or magical processes.[1] These terms, whilst useful in demonstrating that language has potency, remain tied to classifications of magic and religion. As this study is exploring the worth of these categories I will instead refer to this form of language more neutrally as 'verbal-acts'. I am defining 'verbal-act' as a form of speech that is part of a performance designed to generate a specific result. A similar term, 'speech-act' is also used to describe forms of language that are used to create desired results:

[1] In the Oxford English Dictionary (1989, XVI p 187; III pp 45-6) both 'spell' and 'charm' are described as magical in their definitions. 'Chant' is associated with ritual whereas 'prayer' is directly linked to gods and deities (OED: 1989, XIX pp 773-4; X pp 631-2).

> Language … does not only represent the world; it also allows us to do things: to conjecture and to affirm, to command and to supplicate, to promise and to threaten, to baptise and to make oaths – to perform speech-acts."
>
> (Kissine: 2013, p.1)

The term 'speech-act' encompasses all types of speech that is used to perform an action, not just those that are used in a magical or religious context. 'Verbal-acts' can certainly fall into the category of 'speech-acts'. However, in this study I will maintain a distinction between the two because in my definition of 'verbal-act' language is used to transform reality in a way that goes beyond the use of normal language.

The philosopher Austin ([1962]2009) distinguishes between the meaning of the words that are spoken, and what the spoken word produces. Austin notes that there are forms of language that go beyond merely just speech for the sake of speech and refers to these as 'performatives'. Austin ([1962]2009, pp.3-4) states:

> The name is derived, of course, from 'perform', the usual verb with the noun 'action': it indicated that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action — it is not normally thought of as just saying something.

The term 'performative' encompasses any kind of speech that performs an action, including spells or prayers, but also acts like promises, requests, and judgements. Austin ([1962]2009, p.9) does, however, note that whilst performatives might be the most important part in a certain act there are other factors that must be fulfilled in order to ensure success. He also states that there are several reasons which cause the act to fail.[2] Austin further divides speech into three distinct parts: locution, illocution, and perlocution. These are defined as:

> 1. The locutionary act is the performance of the act of saying something which presents itself at the level of utterance, such as vocabulary and grammar, which demonstrates what has been said or written.

[2]Austin ([1962] 2009, p.25-52) states that performatives can either be felicitous or infelicitous. Felicitous performatives are those that are successful and meet all the required conditions in order to function. Infelicitous performatives are unsuccessful and somehow do not meet the criteria to function.

> 2. The illocutionary act is the performance of an act in saying something. It indicates the force of what we do in saying something within a conventional rule or set of rules, such as communicating within a given community (e.g. warning, promise, command etc.).
>
> 3. The perlocutionary act is "what we bring about or achieve by saying something" (Austin 1975:109). This refers to the speaker's utterance in accordance with the illocutionary act, i.e., the intended effect of what has been said to the hearer (e.g. persuading, convincing….).
>
> (Cho and Forster: 2017, p.5)

Speech can encompass all three of these acts through its meaning (locution), its action (illocution), and its effect (perlocution).

The illocutionary act has a great importance as it sets the terms for the act performed. Requesting, ordering, threatening might all cause the same result, the locutionary act might even be the same, but the mechanism that made the act happen is different. For example, 'don't do that' could be said in different tones, with different intonations that create a difference in how the act is viewed and performed. Austin ([1962] 2009, pp.99-100) refers to this as 'illocutionary force'. This is ill-defined by Austin and there is debate about when illocutionary force is present in speech. Searle (1969, 1989) provides an interpretation of Austin's work and puts forward five types of illocutionary act: assertives, commissives, directives, declaratives, and expressives. These categories all have a specific point of view. Searle views illocutionary force as a refinement of the point being made. For some scholars, including Holdcroft (1978), illocutionary force is a trait found in illocutionary acts based on what the speaker intends the outcome of the illocutionary act to be. It is not important if the act is successful, illocutionary force is linked only to the intention and context of the act. Conversely, Bach and Harnish (1979) only consider there to be illocutionary force if the act is successful. The person who hears the speech-act must be aware of the intention of the speaker and perform the act, unsuccessful speech-acts do not have an illocutionary force.

The importance of the intention of speech can be seen throughout the Pali Canon. Four of the ten unwholesome actions (*dasa akusalakammapatha*) focus on

speech: false speech, divisive speech, harsh speech, and idle chatter (A V 57, trans. Bodhi: 2012, p.1521; see also S II 168, Vin V 138). The context and intention that drives the verbal-act must be evaluated in order to fully understand how the verbal-act works and to establish why it was used. It is interesting that there are choices that can be made when illocutionary acts are performed. The speaker can choose the tone or illocutionary point of the act. The speaker could use a protective-chant (*paritta*) or a truth-statement (*saccakiriyā*) for protection. Both acts can have the same effect, but the performance can differ. The speaker must choose an act they are comfortable with, or one they can make effective. By examining the choices made by the speaker we can gain a greater insight into the mechanisms that allow verbal-acts to work.

Intention is not the only element that determines the performance of a performative speech-act. Communication and societal convention can also dictate the way in which they are performed. Austin ([1962]2009, p121) views illocutionary acts as being conventional in nature. They take place as part of a set pattern of behaviour, or an obligation. The way an individual behaves in society can change after a speech-act is performed. If an individual were to say 'I resign' they would no longer be expected to continue in their employment. Acts such as promises, agreements, or assertations are performative as they can change the individual. Illocutionary acts fail when they do not adhere to convention. Lying about being able to complete the activity, planning to break a promise, or making vows that cannot be kept would render the illocutionary act unsuccessful.

It is not just societal conventions that could explain how illocutionary acts work. Searle (1969) and more recently Lepore and Stone (2015) have suggested that linguistic conventions are the determining factor in the success of illocutionary acts. Illocutionary acts work because they follow language rules. If an act used the correct words or phrasing for requesting, asking, or demanding, the act will be successful. The difficulty with linguistic convention is that it demands the locution corresponds directly to the act desired, leaving no room for colloquial or symbolic speech. Telling someone to 'buzz off' does not mean the desired result is for the

listener to make buzzing noises whilst leaving, but rather for the listener to leave the presence of the speaker.

The view that illocutionary acts are conventional fits within the framework of ritual or magical action. It determines why some acts work and others do not. Verbal-acts in the Pali Canon can be examined to see if they fall into convention, either linguistic or religious. Later in this chapter I will explore how language is perceived and understood to operate in the Pali Canon. This will provide a basis for further exploration of whether verbal-acts are adhering to convention and what effect this has on their efficacy.

Whilst discussion on performatives cannot provide a distinction between magical and ritual action it does provide a framework on which verbal-action can be understood. By using Austin's work on performatives as a basis we can analyse verbal-actions in Theravāda practice to see whether Austin's framework can meaningfully be applied what conditions need to be met in order to make them felicitous.

1.2 Sacred and Profane

The work of philosophers and linguists in determining what performatives are is a way of understanding the technical applications of all language. Whilst these theories can provide some insight into how verbal-acts work, they are limited in their scope. What also needs to be explored is whether the words themselves have inherent power, or if there are other factors that allow the verbal-act to be effective.

In the study of religion there is often a distinction made between sacred and profane which could be applied to language. Tambiah (1968, pp.175-208) divides language into these two different forms. Profane language is ordinary language, used simply to communicate. Sacred language is somehow charged with power. To illustrate this Tambiah (1968, pp.175-208) looks at the distinction between the

vernacular and scriptural language. Scriptural languages such as Latin and Sanskrit stand apart from their vernacular counterparts. They are not the language of the everyday, instead, we see Italian or Hindi used. This distinction, however, becomes blurred in the case of Theravāda Buddhism. The Buddha is said to have taught in local middle Indian dialects but now Pali serves as a scriptural language. Pali is generally considered to be a hybrid language mixing features of eastern and western middle Indian dialects (Gethin: 1998, pp.41-43; Oberlies: 2001, pp.1-3).[3] Rather than view sacred and profane language as different languages it would be prudent to consider them in relevant context.

Verbal-acts can be investigated through the scope of ritual studies. In many definitions of ritual there is mention of verbal-act. The ecological anthropologist Rappaport (1999, p.24) sees ritual as "the performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performers". Tambiah (1979, p.119) notes that "ritual is a culturally constructed system of symbolic communication". By examining verbal-acts as ritual (and as in the introduction as magical) the relationship between the acts and Theravāda symbolism can be explored. For the purposes of this study I will be classifying magic as a form of ritual. The verbal-acts found in this thesis contain some performative elements that enable the act to work. The scholarship that examines ritual and verbal-action centers on whether the verbal-act is successful because of the words themselves or other factors.

The social anthropologist Leach (1966, p.407) commented that ritual is "a complex of words and actions… it is not the case that words are one thing and rite another. The uttering of words itself is 'ritual'." He claims that verbal and behavioural elements of ritual action cannot be separated; both are needed for the success of the ritual. Leach (1976, p.10) indicates that the individual does not need to be aware of what the ritual means or what they are saying as long as it conforms to the prescribed pattern. Leach's interpretation can be applied to verbal-acts as they appear in the Pali Canon. The behaviour of the individual, discussed later,

[3] Gombrich (2018) presents a differing account of the origin of Pali, arguing that it was developed by the Buddha himself.

works in combination with the use of the spoken word to create a successful verbal-act.

In his work on ritual and language Tambiah (1985, p.79) also drew on the work of Austin and classes both magical and ritual acts as illocutionary performatives. In his application of performatives to magic and ritual Tambiah (1985, pp.80-81) likens the performance of such acts to the sympathetic magic of Frazer ([1922]1993, p.11). The words spoken in the performative act have a symbolic connection to the object or desired outcome of the ritual, and it is through this connection that the act becomes successful. Here, the term magic is subsumed under the category of ritual, there is no attempt to distinguish one from the other. Tambiah (1985, p.84), however, does imply a difference in which magic serves a practical and often individual purpose and ritual is used to give the world meaning.

Malinowski ([1935]1954) in his pragmatic, functional approach towards languages states that words do not function in meaning but instead in their context.[4] In his discussion on magical language Malinowski ([1935]1954, p.215) notes that:

> We must try to place the utterances of magic within their appropriate context of nature belief and see what information we can elicit which may help us toward the understanding of spells to the elucidation of words.

Whilst his statement looks at magical language it can be applied to verbal-acts as well. From this we can derive that the meaning of the verbal-acts is found in the context of the act being performed. Notably, Malinowski sees verbal-acts as deeply irrational as they hinge on "the belief that the repetitive statement of certain words is believed to produce the reality stated" (1965, p.238).

Staal, a specialist in South and South-East Asian studies, argued against the notion that there are symbols present in ritual. Staal (1979, pp.2-22) states:

[4] Malinowski's (1935, p.58) pragmatic take on language goes as far as to state 'Ultimately all the meaning of all words is derived from bodily experience'

> A widespread but erroneous assumption about ritual is that it consists in symbolic activities which refer to something else. It is characteristic of a ritual performance, however, that it is self-contained and self-absorbed.

For Staal (1979, p.12) it is precisely because ritual is empty of meaning that so much meaning has been attached to it:

> The meaninglessness of ritual explains the variety of meanings attached to it. It could not be otherwise. Ideal activity cannot fail to resemble actual activity. Therefore rituals resemble other things, including features of myth and social structure. However, though a ritual activity may resemble a meaningful non-ritual activity, this does not imply that it must itself be meaningful.

Ritual, in this case, provides a reflection of the myth or society it is portraying. The ideals and lessons that might not come from the performance of the ritual, but rather from whatever it resembles. Potentially this reading of ritual language can be applied to the acts in the Pali Canon. Are verbal-acts morphed into whatever the speaker desires it to resemble, or do the words used in the act have a more direct correlation with the intended result?

1.3 Perceptions of Language in the Pali Canon

The types of language discussed above are terms and ideas that appear in English. They have a resonance within cultures and societies that the terms originated in. Whilst these terms are useful it should be acknowledged that they do not necessarily have a direct translation into Pali and the associations and connotations that are ascribed to them might be different in a Theravāda Buddhist context. Before an in-depth study of language in Theravāda Buddhism can take place, it would be worth considering its teachings concerning speech and language.

In the Dhammacakkappavattana-Sutta (S V 420-423) the Buddha outlines his teachings in the Four Noble Truths. These are that there is suffering (*dukkha*), which it has its origins in craving (*taṇhā*) and is born through ignorance (*avijjā*), that suffering can be ended, and that there is a way to achieve the end of suffering. In the last truth the eightfold path is introduced. This is a way in which *nibbāna* can be

attained through living a moral life and cultivating certain forms of virtuous behaviour. The area of interest in this instance is right speech (*sammāvācā*). It is considered part of the eightfold path associated with virtue. The nature of right speech is explained clearly in the Maggavibhaṅga-Sutta (Bodhi: 2000, p.1528; S V 1-10): 'And what, bhikkhus, is right speech? Abstinence from false speech, abstinence from divisive speech, abstinence from harsh speech, abstinence from idle chatter: this is called right speech.' This clarification is also found in the unwholesome actions (*dasa akusalakammapatha*; A V 57) where ill-intentioned speech is outlined and warned against.

Speech is something that needs to be conducted in a thoughtful manner. In the Sutta Nipata it would appear that speech should be truthful and kind, however, it should also be noted that speech also needs to take into consideration a wider context including the audience and desired outcome. In the Abhayarājakumāra-Sutta (M I 392-396) it is noted that:

> …such speech as the Tathāgata knows to be untrue, incorrect, and unbeneficial, and which is also unwelcome and disagreeable to others… true and correct but unbeneficial, and which is also unwelcome and disagreeable to others… true, correct, and beneficial, but which is unwelcome and disagreeable to others... untrue, incorrect, and unbeneficial, but which is welcome and agreeable to others... true and correct but unbeneficial, and which is welcome and agreeable to others: such speech the Tathāgata does not utter. Such speech as the Tathāgata knows to be true, correct, and beneficial, and which is welcome and agreeable to others: the Tathāgata knows the time to use such speech. Why is that? Because the Tathāgata has compassion for beings.
>
> (Bodhi: 1995, p.500; M I 395)

Although speaking truthfully is important, one should also speak kindly and sympathetically. Speech is shown to affect both the speaker and the listener. It can cause harm for both parties, and when used carefully, it can have beneficial results. It is also shown to be complex. Harsh or false speech used for good reason is still advised against. Speech is shown repeatedly to be a powerful tool that has lasting consequences.

Speech is something that needs to be conducted in a proper manner as it is determined by the individual's intention and thus generates *kammic* results. Within Theravāda Buddhist thought *kamma* has a causative nature. Actions performed by the individual will have a particular *kammic* result. In the Nikāyas there are four ways in which *kamma* can work:

> …there are four kinds of action proclaimed by me after realising them for myself with direct knowledge. What are the four? There is dark action with dark result; there is bright action with bright result; there is dark-and-bright action with dark-and-bright result; and there is action that is neither dark nor bright with neither-dark-nor-bright result, action that leads to the destruction of action.
>
> (Bodhi: 1995, p.495; M I 389 cf. A II 230-237, D III 229)

This shows that good deeds will result in a pleasant and favourable *kammic* result, whilst malicious and hurtful misdeeds will result in a poor and unfavourable *kammic* result. Speech that causes harm or upset will produce negative *kammic* effects for the individual, whereas speech that is truthful and considerate will produce positive *kammic* effects. This is an important fact to consider when looking at transformative language in Theravāda Buddhist practice. Speech has a moral value that is dependent upon its intention meaning that all speech has the potential to be transformative in either a positive or negative manner. The texts quoted seem to focus on the transformative effect regarding the speaker rather than the individual being spoken to. However, both right speech (*sammāvācā*) and the *kammic* results of speech are transformative to the individual and can have a transformative effect on others. They form the basis of Theravāda ideas on speech and can help us in understanding the mechanisms that lie behind magical and religious speech but should not be seen as magical in their own right as they do not cause a supernormal change, but instead cause a change of emotion or perception.

Conclusion

Language in its most basic function is a means to communicate. Individuals can use it to communicate their needs and desires. What separates verbal-acts is their

ability to communicate a need and deliver a result at the same time. The way in which verbal-acts derive their efficacy remains a topic of debate within academic study. This, in part, is dues to the fact that the study of language is interdisciplinary. The meaning of words and speech is used to forge communities and bind them in mutual understanding. By examining theories concerning language and speech from both scholarly and Buddhist perspectives I have sought to demonstrate that there are a number of ways in which verbal-acts can gain power and potency.

Viewing verbal-acts in relation to performatives and illocutionary acts allows there to be an analysis of the words used in the verbal-act. Scholars such as Burchett (2008) and Taylor (2015) have examined areas of Indian religion through the lens of illocution. However, in the case of Taylor (2015, p.530) there is a ready dismissal of magic as being "more at home in the villages and urban gallis, rather than in … [a] more orthodox ritual setting". Whilst there is a brief examination of what magic is, Taylor does not examine how or why magic should not be viewed in the same religious context as ritual. Indeed, Taylor appears ready to classify magical acts as being the domain of the uneducated and unconnected from more complex readings of religious practice. This, in my opinion, is an ungenerous reading of magical acts, maligning both the acts themselves and those that might use them. Burchett (2008) provides a much more substantive investigation of the relationship between religion and magic in his examination of mantra as a form of magical language. This study will provide a continuation of the discussion of performatives and illocutionary acts by examining them within the Pali Canon. Rather than view illocutionary acts in terms of intention or convention, both will be considered in later chapters. Convention shows the structure that predicates the success of a verbal-act, how society or the individual understands language. By examining verbal-acts through their intent, the choices made by the speaker can be analysed.

Verbal-acts can also be seen as an extension of the myths and symbols central to society. They are placed into a context where they are ascribed meaning and worth. It is important to consider how verbal-acts are understood to function within the world view of the society in question. Again, there are questions that need to be considered: are words believed to have inherent power? Is the language

used understood or even spoken by members of society? How are these acts received by society? In this study, the verbal-acts used in the Pali Canon need to be viewed in the appropriate context. The success of verbal-acts that are found in the Pali Canon are not due to the power of words alone, but instead must combine the correct words, meaning, intent, as well as other factors such as the worth of the individual performing the act.

Chapter Two: Verbal-Acts in the Pali Canon

The use of verbal-acts to effect change is found throughout the Pali Canon. The use of these acts is varied. They can be used to provide protection, to heal, and to aid in rebirth. The use of verbal-acts needs to be addressed within the context of the Pali Literature before there can be an examination of the mechanisms that allow it to work. This context includes the framing of the verbal-act within the story, who performed the verbal-act, who the recipients were, and why the act was used. Investigating these elements of verbal-acts will establish whether there are any common themes, and how such acts are received.

Three of the key terms that will be explored are protective-chant (*paritta*), vow (*patthanā*), and truth-utterance (*saccakiriyā*). The reason that these form the basis of this chapter is the role that they play within Theravāda literature, and the fact that their use still occurs in modern Theravāda practice (Langer: 2007, pp.19-22). These terms are used provide an insight into how verbal-acts are used and received. There are, however, some terms that will not be covered in detail in this chapter. There are many terms that can be found within the Pali Canon that are associated with verbal-acts such as charm (*manta*; S I 57, M II 166) and magical acts associated with the Atharvaveda (*āthabbaṇa*; Sn 927).[5] I have chosen to focus on forms of language that demonstrate both magical and religious qualities as this will allow for an interesting discussion. Likewise, I have selected these terms as I intend to expand upon existing scholarship that examines their role and function within Theravāda Buddhism.

2.1 Protective-Chants (*Paritta*)

The most recognisable form of verbal-act in Theravāda Buddhist practice is the protective-chant (*paritta*). In its most simple form it is the recitation of specific *suttas* or passages that are taken from the Pali Canon that are understood to afford

[5] I have not included these examples in this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, these acts are often associated with Vedic verbal-acts and thus would not be good examples of Theravāda verbal-acts. Secondly there is little research into these examples that examines them in relation to the Pali Canon and Theravāda practice.

those that recite or listen to it with protection, wellbeing and merit. The use of protective-chants within Theravāda practice can be traced back to the Pali Canon and remains to this day a staple in Theravāda (Ferguson: 2014, pp.47-64; Langer: 2012; De Silva: 1981, pp.31-57). The way in which protective-chants are performed can vary from small scale chanting to rituals that are incorporated into larger events such as funerals. Regardless of scale, it is believed to be an efficacious act. In Pali protective-chants *(paritta)* has two meanings. The Pali-English Dictionary (Rhys Davids: [1925]2011, p.426) first defines it as 'limited' or 'small' and secondly provides the definition 'protection'. In the context of this chapter it is the second definition that is of interest. There is also a similar term in Pali, *parittāṇa*, which also means protection.

What these definitions do not provide is an insight into what is meant by protection. Protection could come in the form of something physical that makes the individual impervious to harm, or it could be a mental safeguard that allows the individual to alleviate feelings of fear and uncertainty. Protective-chants are often described as being 'apotropaic' (Spiro:1970, pp.143, 159-161; Saddhatissa: 1991, p.125) or prophylactic (De Silva: 1981, p.139) highlighting that it can prevent or avert misfortune. Gombrich ([1971]2009, p.201) defines protective-chants *(paritta)* as 'amulet'. Amulet itself means something that wards away evil and provides protection. This does encompass what protective-chants are understood to provide; however, it is somewhat misleading. The term amulet is frequently used in association with physical objects and provide a nuanced reading of what protective-chants are and what they do. De Silva (1981) acknowledges that protective-chant has different meanings in modern Theravāda Buddhism. De Silva (1981, pp.3-4) states that protective-chants can be viewed as either a *sutta* (a passage from the Pali Canon) or the ritual in which the protective-chants are used.

As *paritta* means protection its use within the Pali Canon often reflects this as a means of avoiding physical harm. This form of protection can be manifested in many ways. In the Dīgha Nikāya the term *parittāṇa* appears thirteen times in the compounded form *saraparittāṇam* which can be translated as 'charms against

arrows' (Walshe: 1995, p72) or 'protection from arrows'[6]. All the references to this protection from arrows occur in the first thirteen *suttas* of the Dīgha Nikāya. These *suttas* are concerned with the stages of the Buddhist path and the moral rules associated with monks. Whilst the frame stories address an array of people from different backgrounds including kings, wandering ascetics, householders and brahmins, there is a common theme that links the thirteen uses of *parittāṇa*. It appears in identical passages twelve times and the remaining use is in a very similar passage but refers to the Buddha rather than his followers. It first appears in the Brahmajāla-Sutta (D I 1-46) and is included as part of a list of practices that monks should not perform for money:

> Whereas some ascetics and Brahmins, **feeding on the food of the faithful, make their living by** such base arts, such wrong means of livelihood as palmistry, divining by signs, portents, dreams, body-marks, mouse-gnawings, fire-oblations, oblations from a ladle, of husks, rice-powder, rice- grains, ghee or oil, from the mouth or of blood, reading the finger-tips, house- and garden-lore, skill in charms, ghost- lore, earth-house lore, snake-lore, poison-lore, rat-lore, bird- lore, crow-lore, foretelling a person's life-span, charms against arrows, knowledge of animals' cries, the ascetic Gotama refrains from such base arts and wrong means of livelihood.[7]
>
> (Walshe: 1995, pp.71-2; D I 9)

This passage is part of a discussion about acts that ascetics are known to perform. This is a far-reaching set of skills that includes palmistry (D I 9), arranging marriages (D I 11) and even medicinal acts such as surgery and medicines (D I 11). What this, and the twelve following *suttas*, states are that these acts should not be performed by monks for money. It is worth noting that there is no statement that forbids monks from performing the various acts that are mentioned. In this respect I refute R. Obeyesekere's (1991: p.123) assessment of the Brahmajāla-Sutta rejecting spells and other types of magical practice. Medicine can hardly be seen as immoral. These *suttas* are instructing monks that they should not accept payment for performing these acts whilst they are accepting alms. One can be a monk, or one can earn a

[6] If not indicated otherwise, translations are my own.
[7] Emphasis is mine.

wage but doing both is unacceptable. This does not exclude the possibility that some of these acts are inappropriate for monks, but this is not what the passage seems to emphasize.

When followed up in the commentary to the Dīgha Nikāya, the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, protection from arrows (*saraparittāṇam*) is referred to twice (Sv I 94; Sv I 157). In the first instance (Sv I 94) the commentary explains protection from arrows as *'karaṇa-vījjā*'.[8] *Karaṇa* can be translated as meaning 'making' whilst *vijjā* can be translated as 'knowledge' or as 'charm' (Rhys Davids: [1925]2011, p.196, 617). In the context of its surrounding acts I would err on a reading of this act as a charm or verbal formula. In its second use protection from arrows is described as acting as if it were armour (*camma*).[9] From this it can be inferred as providing a physical protection from arrows, as if it were a suit of armour that is generated through the use of a charm. [10] Again it is worth noting that this is not placed within a religious context, the wording of the charm is not mentioned and it is a form of protection that is practised by Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike.

In the Aṅguttara Nikāya there are two instances of *paritta* being used and these are found within the Ahina-Sutta (A II 72-3). In this *sutta* the Buddha advocates the use of *paritta* as a way of providing protection from being harmed by snakes. The first use of *paritta*, in the form of *attaparittaya* which means 'for your own… protection' (Bodhi: 2012, p.456; A II 72), occurs when the Buddha is introducing the listeners to the instructions he has on how to protect themselves from snakebites. The second occurrence is during the verses that the Buddha instructs the monks to repeat. The story that is found in the Ahina-Sutta is also found in the Vinaya (Vin II 109) showing that the recitation of the verses is recommended to monks in order to help them be protected from snakebites and other dangerous animals they

[8] *Sara-parittānan ti sara-rakkhaṇaṃ. Yathā attano upari na āgacchati evam karaṇa-vijjā.* (D-a I 94)
[9] *Camma-yodhino to camma-kañcukaṃ vā pavisitvā saraparittānaṃ cammaṃ vā gahetvā yujjhanti* (D-a I 157)
[10] There are accounts of Brahmanical *mantras* that provide protection as if the individual was wearing armour. In the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (which is dated between 500-1000 BCE, making it later than the Dīgha Nikāya), for example, there is a *mantra* that provides the individual with physical protection and is referred to in the text as acting as if it was armour. Czyżykowski (2014, pp.29-39) has examined this *mantra* in further detail and in relation to Staal's (1979) assertion that ritual language is meaningless.

might encounter. Schmithausen (1997) has collected accounts from a range of Indian sources about similar methods for avoiding or curing snakebites.[11] This includes Vedic sources such as the Ṛgveda and Atharvaveda. In the Ṛgveda (1.191) there is a section about various poisons, and it calls on the sun and moon to cure those who have been bitten. In Atharvaveda there are similar verses that can be used to seek protection from snakebites:

> May the serpent, ye gods, not slay us along with our children and our men! The closed (jaw) shall not snap open, the open one not close! Reverence (be) to divine folk!
>
> Reverence be to the black serpent, reverence to the one that is striped across! To the brown svaga [sic] reverence; reverence to the divine folk!
>
> I clap thy teeth upon thy teeth, and also thy jaw upon thy jaw; I press thy tongue against thy tongue, and close up, O serpent, thy mouth
>
> (Bloomfield: [1897]1967, pp.151-152 AV VI 56)

These provide just some examples of a history of verbal rituals being used to gain protection. The Atharvaveda itself is referred to as the "Veda of magical formulas" (Patton: 2005, p.38) showing the long history of verbal-acts being used in Indian traditions. The protective-chant, which is commonly referred to as the *Khandaparitta*, is a progression of this form of ritual.[12] By having the Buddha compose the *paritta*, and having it contain explicit reference to the Buddha, *Dhamma*, and *Saṅgha*, this verbal-act becomes something that is identifiably Buddhist in nature.

The Khuddaka Nikāya contains some of the most interesting accounts of protective-chants. Within the Jātakas found within the Khuddaka Nikāya and their subsequent commentaries there are several accounts of the use of protective-chants. The Jātakas themselves are short verses, but the commentary (Jātakatthavaṇṇanā) provides an explanation of the verses and a story to

[11] Slouber (2012) provides a fascinating insight into the history of snakebite prevention in religious texts.

[12] Whilst both Vedic and Pali sources show a level of homage paid to the families of snakes the Vedas have examples in which the tone is threatening. See Schmithausen (1997: p. 25-33).

accompany them.[13] The structure of the Jātaka suggests that it belongs to an oral tradition with the verses being arranged into an order based on their length. Appleton (2010, p.54) states that the ordering of the chapters of the Jātaka is for mnemonic purposes. It is also interesting to note that many of the verses are not explicitly Buddhist in nature and it is through the Jātakatthavaṇṇanā that the verses are incorporated into Buddhist teaching.[14] It is important, to look at both the Jātaka and Jātakatthavaṇṇanā to see how each represent protective-chants and their function.[15] The Jātaka stories are set before the time of the Buddha and follow him as a *bodhisatta* in his previous lifetimes. This is an important for several reasons. Both Rhys-Davids (1929, pp.xviii-xix) and Appleton (2010, p.vii), note they are a clear illustration of the *bodhisatta* path and allow for the Buddha's past to be explored. The Jātakas are also useful for allowing the reader to see how the *bodhisatta* attained the ten perfections (*pāramitā*). These *pāramitā* need to be attained by the *bodhisatta* in order to attain buddhahood. They include qualities such as loving-kindness (*mettā*), generosity (*dāna*), wisdom (*prajñā*), and morality (*śīla*). The qualities of the *bodhisatta* could be a contributing factor to the success of protective-chants.

There have been many studies that look at the Jātakas as an insight into pre-Buddhist India (Rhys Davids: 1903; De: 1951). There are certainly strong indications that some of the content found in the Jātakas is pre-Buddhist.[16] Many of the stories that feature in the Jātakatthavaṇṇanā are understood as being adapted from Indian folklore (Ohnuma: 2007, p.401). Whilst it would be tempting to argue that this could provide an insight into pre-Buddhist thought on magic and the use of verbal rituals, it would ignore the fact that the Jātakas are a Buddhist document. Instead, the Jātakas can provide a possible indication of the practice and reception of such

[13] Warder (1970, p. 97, 225) has attempted to date the various parts of the Jātaka. He notes that the Jātaka was most likely composed over a period of time by serval authors.
[14]See Appleton (2010, p. 61)
[15] Appleton (2010, p.7 fn.14) makes an interesting point about the different perceptions scholars have of 'canonical' and 'commentarial' texts and warns against viewing the Jātakatthavaṇṇanā as being a lesser work.
[16] For example, there are similarities between the *Vessantara Jātaka* and *Rāmāyaṇa*. In his work on the *Vessantara Jātaka* Collins (2016, p.2) notes that any attempt to find the true origin of Jātaka stories would be 'quixotic'. There are also similarities between the Jātakas and Jain stories as outlined by Meiland (2003, pp.21-22).

acts in pre-Buddhist or non-Buddhist settings but it should not be read as a definitive history of ancient Indian views.

Many of the examples of verbal-acts found in the Jātakas do not use the terms *paritta*, *saccakiriyā,* or *patthanā* to describe the act. Whilst not directly referenced in the text, the use of these verbal-acts can be inferred. The only Jātaka that contains the term protective-chant (*paritta*) is that of the *Mora* Jātaka (Ja ii 33-38). This Jātaka recounts the time that the *bodhisatta* was a golden peacock. In order to protect himself from a hunter he would speak some verses in the morning and in the evening. The peacock is captured when he is distracted and fails to recite the verses. It is stated that the golden peacock is virtuous and has religious sensibilities that allow for his protective-chants to work (Ja ii 33). The verses recited by the peacock refer to the sun. From this it suggests that specific verbal-acts correspond to specific situations. This correlates to the accounts of protective-chants (*paritta*) discussed so far which have had targeted applications. The Jātaka also suggests that these performatives do not have a lasting result. The peacock had to chant the verses twice a day and it was his failure to complete this that led to his capture.

In the Khuddaka Nikāya there is a collection of texts known as the Khuddakapāṭha. The Khuddakapāṭha has been described by the Indologist Norman and Gonda (1983: p.58) as a handbook for novice monks, and by Geiger and Ghosh (1943: p.19) as a prayer book that was intended for daily use. Several of the *suttas* found within the Khuddakapāṭha are used in ceremonies in contemporary Theravāda practice. This notion can be seen in more recent research where Blackburn (1999) and Samuels (2005) have outlined ways in which protective-chants are useful, and indeed important, in the training of monks. Blackburn (1999, p.363) and Samuels (2005, p.347ff) observe that the recitation of protective-chants is important in teaching monks discipline. Perhaps, the training aspect of the Khuddakapāṭha can provide an explanation as to why texts that contain protective-chants are repeated in the Khuddakapāṭha. These include the Karaniya-mettā-Sutta (Khp 9 and Sn 143-152), Maṅgala-Sutta (Khp5 and Sn 258-69)[17] and the Ratana-

[17] Cf. Ja IV 72-79

Sutta (Khp 6 and Sn 222-38). There are no specific references to the term protective-chant (*paritta*) in these texts but the passages are described as being protective-chants (*paritta*). In the case of the Ratana-Sutta the commentary directly associates the *sutta* with protective-chants. The Khuddakpāṭha provides a convenient teaching tool in which the practical tools of protective-chants can be learned whilst formalising monastic skills and knowledge.

The list of texts that contain protective-chants and protective qualities in the Khuddakapāṭha are like those found in the post-canonical Milindapañha. The Milindapañha (Miln I 150-154) has a chapter that looks at protective-chants (*paritta*). It identifies some canonical texts that it views as being protective:

> Safety-runes [*paritta*] were however appointed by the Lord, that is to say the Jewel-Sutta, the safety rune in the Khandha(ka), the Peacock safety-rune, the Crest of the Banner safety-rune, the Āṭānāṭiya safety rune and Angulimāla's safety rune.
>
> (Horner: 1963, p.211; Miln I 150-1)[18]

The Ratana-Sutta and Khandaparitta both feature within the Khuddakapāṭha, and Moraparitta has already been examined in relation to the Jātakas. The Dhajaggaparitta refers to the verses the Buddha composed in the Dhajagga-Sutta (S I 218-220) that should be recited when any of his followers are feeling afraid and should be done whilst contemplating the *Dhamma*. The Āṭānāṭiyaparitta consists of verses that were given to the Buddha by the four kings as a form of protection from ogres (*yakkhas*). The Buddha sanctions these verses and states that the verses will protect all that recite them.

> Monks, you should learn these Āṭānāṭiya protective verses, master them and remember them. They are for your benefit, and through them monks and nuns, male and female lay followers may dwell guarded, protected, unharmed and at ease.
>
> (Walshe: 1995, p.478; D III 206)

[18] These are the Ratana-Sutta (Khp 6 and Sn 222-38), the protective-chant found in the Khandhaka (Vin ii 109 and also the same story in A II 72), the Mora Jātaka (Ja ii 33), the Dhajagga-Sutta (S I 218-220), the Āṭānāṭiya-Sutta (D iii 195-202) and the Aṅgulimāla-Sutta (M ii 97-105).

What is interesting to note here is that the protective-chant is solving an issue for monks, to protect them from ogres who live in forests and in the wilderness who might cause them harm, but later in the text it is recommended for all followers of the Buddha to use. The *sutta* identifies who can and should use the text. The sanction from the Buddha highlights the value of the *paritta* and provides it with legitimacy.

The protective-chants that I have examined so far which are mentioned in the Milindapañha have dealt with problematic beings and fear caused by external elements. The Aṅgulimāla protective-chant deviates from this somewhat and references the statement made by Aṅgulimāla in order to assist a woman during childbirth (M ii 97-105). It is not explicitly mentioned what causes the complication with the pregnancy; it might still be caused by ogres (*yakkhas*) or other external factors, but it is unknown. This chapter of the Milindapañha also notes the use of protective-chants as a way to cure illnesses as well as providing protection. It does, however, have a caveat to the curative powers of these protective-chants which is that it cannot bring back the dead, nor can it extend or prolong the life of someone who is near death.

The previous examples have shown protective-chants can be performed by the religiously aware and the meritorious. The examples also highlight the verbal nature of protective-chants but have not indicated if other actions need to occur for the act to be successful. There are some examples of cases in which supplementary actions are used in conjunction to the verbal-act. In the commentary to the Ratana-Sutta (Sn A 204-5) Ananda sprinkles water from the Buddha's alms bowl whilst chanting the protective verses. The pouring and sprinkling of water are still found within modern performances of protective-chants (De Silva: 1981, pp.143-145). Gombrich ([1971]2009, p.204) argues both the Ratana-Sutta and the Telapatta Jātaka provide an insight into the performance of protective-chants and claims that it has not changed much since the Jātaka commentaries were written. In the Telapatta Jātaka (JA 393-401) a prince has a protective-chant (*paritta*) performed for him and during the ceremony he takes *s*and and thread. Whilst I cannot find any evidence for the practices involving sand, the use of thread in modern Theravāda

ceremonies is well known (De Silva: 1981, pp.141-145; Langer: 2007, pp.10-11). The use of these items is not always seen in the texts but suggests the protection afforded by the performance of the chants (*paritta*) can be transferred to items and this protection can be transferred from one location to another, extending the initial reach of the protective-chant.

2.2 Truth-Statements (*Saccakiriyā*)

'Truth-statement' (*saccakiriyā*) is not a widely used term in the Pali Canon. It only makes three appearances, all of which are found in the Cariyāpiṭaka of the Khuddaka Nikāya. It is translated as 'a statement of truth' or 'solemn declaration' (Rhys Davids: 1925, p667); it is ascribed to events where an individual has used the truth to manipulate events. It is an act that appears in many Indian traditions, including the Vedas and Jain texts. The truth is a powerful thing and according to Sohnen-Thieme (1995, pp.235-6) it can be used to produce certain results. In the Atharvaveda (AV 4.18.1; Bloomfield [1897] 1964 p.70) the truth is stated in order to protect against witchcraft: "night is like unto the sun, the (starry) night is similar to day. The truth do I engage for help: the enchantments shall be devoid of force!". There are differences in non-Buddhist examples of the power of truth.[19] In the Pali Canon the power of the truth generates the success of the verbal-act, whereas in the Vedas the act persuades a god to intercede.

The nature and exact mechanisms of truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*) is the subject of much debate with many conflicting sources. One of the earliest examinations of truth-statements was conducted by the Sanskrit and Pali scholar Burlingame (1917, pp.429-467). Burlingame (1917, p.429) describes truth-acts as: "An Act of Truth is a formal declaration of fact, accompanied by a command or resolution or prayer that the purpose of the agent shall be accomplished". Truth-statements are ritualistic in nature and are more than simply telling the truth. One must relate a personal truth and follow it up with an exact command or purpose. He also notes that the Pali term *saccakiriyā* is not the only word used in both Sanskrit and Pali sources to denote a truth-act. The term 'truth utterance' is also

[19] Hopkins (1932, pp.316-337) provides a list of occasions where truth is used as the basis of oaths and curses in Hindu Epics.

associated with *saccavajja* and *saccavacana* in Pali (Burlingame: 1917, p.434). Whilst there are several terms that can be used to denote statements of truth, the actual truth uttered by the individual is rarely recorded. A reference to the verbal-act is made, but the content of the act is not included. Brown (1972b, p.66) states that in both the Vedic literature and Buddhist literature the actual truth part of the truth-statement is not represented in the text, but it is instead inferred. What this means for this thesis is that I will have to examine acts that have the potential to be classed as truth-statements.

The Cariyāpiṭaka is similar to the Jātaka as it also recounts stories of the Buddha in his previous births. It is a late addition to the Pali Canon and has been described by the Indologist von Hinuber (2000, p.43) as 'hagiographical'. The assumed lateness of the Cariyāpiṭaka and the lack of the use of the term truth-statement (*saccakiriyā*) elsewhere in the canon suggests that the term could also be a later addition to Buddhist terminology perhaps used in order to replace the existing terms *saccavajja* and *saccavacana* (Burlingame: 1917, p.434). Appleton (2010, p.58) outlines that the Jātakas and the Cariyāpiṭaka are concerned with the nature of the *bodhisatta*, so it is not surprising to find that they focus on the *bodhisatta* and his qualities. These stories will present the *bodhisatta* in such a way to stress these perfections.

One of the perfections outlined is that of truth (*saccapāramitā*) and it is in the stories concerning this that we find the use of the term truth-statement (*saccakiriyā*). Two instances of the term are found in the story of a quail who saves itself from a fire using the truth after being abandoned by its parents:

> Reflecting on the power of Dhamma, remembering former Conquerors, relying on the power of truth, I made an asseveration of truth:
>
> "Wings there are that fly not, feet there are that walk no. Mother and father are gone away Jātaveda, recede."
>
> (Horner: 1975, p.41; Cp.9)

In this story the quail states three truths. Firstly, it refers to the nature of reality (*Dhamma*), secondly the quail uses the truth that it cannot use its own wings and

feet, and thirdly that its mother and father have gone away. The power of these truths stopped the fire and saved the young quail. The third occurrence of the term truth-statement (*saccakiriyā*) appears in the story of a fish king who uses the truth to protect his fellow fish from being eaten by birds as a drought has reduced the water levels in the lake they live in:

> Having recollected the true Dhamma, considering the highest good, I made an asseveration of truth that would be lasting, eternal in the world:
>
> "As long as I (can) remember about myself, ever since I have come to (years of) discretion I am not aware of having hurt intentionally even one living thing. By this utterance of truth may Pajjunna pour down rain. Thunder, Pajjuna! Destroy the treasure trove of the crows, besiege the crows with grief, set free the fishes from grief."
>
> (Horner: 1975; Cp.10)

Once he has made his truthful statement and requests for rain it starts to rain. In these accounts the individuals refer to two truths. Firstly, a reference to the nature of reality (*Dhamma*) and secondly a statement about a truth that is personal to themselves.

There are examples in the Jātakas that imply the use of truth-statements for the means of protection. In the Supparaka Jātaka (Ja IV 136-143) a blind man saves his ship and crew after telling the truth. After noticing the ship was in dangerous water the man pronounced that he has never knowingly taken the life of a creature. With this the ship was suddenly out of the dangerous sea and in calm water. Interestingly, both stories found in the Cariyāpiṭaka also appear in the Jātakas. In the Maccha Jātaka (JA I 210- 212) there is a fish in a pond which is drying up due to a drought. The fish uses the truth to make it rain. In the Vaṭṭaka Jātaka (JA I 212-215) a baby quail uses the truth to stop a fire. However, in the Jātakas the word for truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*) is not used. The Cariyāpiṭaka strikes a different tone to the Jātakas as it has a greater focus on the nature of Buddhahood. Appleton (2010, p.111) argues: "the acts described are in some way typological and exemplary: they are about Buddhahood, not the Buddha, and arahantship, not

arahants. Yet they are also part of a personal bibliographical corpus". The Jātakas focus on the Bodhisatta whereas the Cariyāpiṭaka focuses on behaviour and practice.

There are, however, also accounts of truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*) being used for more trivial matters whilst retaining a moral element. In the Andabhuta Jātaka (Ja I 289-295) truth-statements are used repeatedly as a way of winning a game. The king and chaplain in the story both manipulate a woman by keeping her faithful and obedient to her husband and later by tempting her into an affair in order to stop the truth-statement used by their opponent from working. The woman in the story attempts to use a statement of truth in order to prove her worth as well. In all of the instances of truths used, or attempted, the nature of virtue in women was used as the basis. In the Paṇḍara Jātaka (Ja V 75-88) the truth is used in order to curse and kill rivals. In this Jātaka an ascetic betrays the confidence of a snake king which results in the snake king being caught by his rival, the garuda (a type of bird that is also a *deva*) king. However, the snake king and the garuda king reconcile and decide to visit the ascetic. The snake king then uses the truth of the wickedness of the ascetic to kill him by splitting his head into seven pieces.

2.3 Vows and Wishes (*Patthanā*)

The use of the truth to create a better future can be linked to truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*). This concept can also be seen in the Dhammapada Atthakatha. However, the term truth-statement (*saccakiriyā*) is not used to denote this. Instead the term vow (*patthanā*) is used. *Patthanā* can be translated as 'earnest-wish' (Rhys Davids: 1925, p.407). Whilst it has a similar structure to truth-statements there are some slight differences. The structure is a true statement followed by a statement expressing a desire or a wish. Gombrich ([1971] 2009, pp.222-223) notes that there are three forms that these vows (*patthanā*) take within Pali sources. First there are those associated with dying and rebirth, those used to gain worldly possessions, and thirdly those used to attain religious goals. These purposes for the use of this act have many similarities with those that drive the use of protective-chants and truth-statements. For example, protective-chants are associated with dying and rebirth insofar as they are chanted at the deathbed

to promote a positive mental state at the moment of death and it also features in funerary practices in Sri Lanka (Langer: 2007, pp 19-23; 2012, p.34). Likewise, there are accounts of both truth-statements and vows being used in order to allow women to conceive. The close link between vows (*patthanā*), truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*) and protective-chants (*paritta*) is worth examining to see if there are any differences in how it is perceived and understood to work.

The moment of death is particularly important in determining the rebirth of an individual. In the Visuddhimagga, (XIX, 14–16), Abhidhammāvatāra (117), and Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha (24) the moment of death is a form of causality where the last moment before death (*cuti viññāna*) conditions the initial consciousness of the reborn being (*paṭisandhi viññāna*). Consequently, in Theravāda thought the moment of death carries a weight in determining an individual's rebirth. The use of vows (*patthanā*) at this moment shows an awareness of this concept by the individuals. There are accounts in the Pali Canon that discuss the ability to choose one's next birth. In the Saṅgīti-Sutta (D III 207–72) it is indicated that if a person is sufficiently moral and resolves to be reborn as a rich person or a *deva,* they can achieve their aim:

> He sees a rich Khattiya or Brahmin or householder living in full enjoyment of the pleasures of the five senses, and he thinks: "If only when I die I may be I reborn as one of these rich people!" He sets his heart on this thought, fixes it and develops it. And this thought, being launched at such a low level, and not developed to a higher level, leads to rebirth right there. But I say this of a moral person, not of an immoral one.
>
> (Walshe: 1995, p.505; D III 258-9)

Whilst not stated as a vow (*patthanā*) it follows a similar structure in which a wish is stated aloud that brings about a better rebirth. The Sankhāruppatti-Sutta (M III 99) also deals with the theme of rebirth by intent. In this *sutta* one must possess the qualities of faith, virtue, wisdom and generosity in order to be reborn into a chosen life. This *sutta* also states that one can, if they have the above qualities, desire to not be reborn, that is to attain *nibbāna*.

The second type of vows (*patthanā*) are used to wish for worldly pleasures or reward. In Dhp-a IV 57-58 it is explained that as a result of a vow (*patthanā*) made in the presence of a buddha in a previous lifetime Khemā was born as an extremely beautiful woman. In Dhp-a II 82-83 it is explained that Citta in a former birth had made a vow so he would receive gifts and be showered with flowers. In an interesting turn there is an example in Dhp-a III 369- 372 where a family and their slave make an earnest-wish to stop a famine and be reborn together with the same roles they have in this life (including the slave). Within these stories there is a stress on the many good qualities of the individuals who have made the vow.

In the Dhammapada-Atthakatha there are many instances in which vows (*patthanā*) are used in order to express a desire to attain certain religious goals. There are, for example, several stories in where an individual only has enough food to either feed themselves or to give alms. In these stories (Dhp-a II 84-85, Dhp-a III 87-95, and Dhp-a III 302-308) the vows here are based on the truth that there is not enough food to be divided between two people and a wish is made that in a future life the almsgiver is able to understand the *Dhamma*. In Dhp-a I 8 it is explained that Sāriputta became a disciple of the Buddha using such a vow. In a previous life he had encountered a *buddha* teaching but was not mindful enough to become enlightened as a result of this. He expressed a truth in the fact that he does not want to be reborn as a Sakka or Brahma, but instead desires to be the chief disciple of a *buddha*. In the same story it is explained that Moggallana also makes an earnest-wish to become a disciple of a *buddha* as well. In Dhp-a IV 200 there it is explained that vows (*patthanā*) can also be used to attain *nibbāna*. In this story there is no explanation of what the truth involved is, but after feeding a *buddha* a man makes a wish stating that he would like to eventually attain enlightenment. It is noted that this man will one day reach his goal although the story does not state whether the man's future Buddhahood was the result of the vow alone or other qualities accrued over countless lifetimes.

Conclusion

The forms of verbal-act found this this chapter were chosen as they reflect different ways of using verbal-acts in Pali literature and in modern Theravāda practice. The three types of verbal-act have a significant degree of overlap. Whilst they have slightly different functions and uses there are clear similarities in the way that they work and derive their efficacy. This is important leading into the next chapter as the mechanisms that allow these acts to work can be compared and analysed.

The differences in performance of these verbal-acts suggests that these verbal-acts have different illocutionary forces. They can be viewed as different ways to generate the same, or similar, results. Protective-chants can take the form of verses that have authority stemming from the Buddha. *Paritta* texts, such as the Karaniya-mettā-Sutta (Khp 9 and Sn 143-152), are linked to the Buddha's teaching. They are a set formula that match the conventions and world view found in the Pali Canon. Their conventionality is echoed in their use in the training of monks. Protective-chants can be used to both educate novice monks and can be used in order to serve the lay community.

Truth-statements provide some of the same outcomes as protective-chants, but the delivery method is more spontaneous and does not require the repeating of statements made by others. The act is driven by truths that are personal to the individual. Whilst these truths can, as seen in the Cariyāpiṭaka, link to Theravāda motifs they are focused on how they pertain to the individual. The results of truth-statements may be like those produced by protective-chants, but the illocutionary force is different. This is the same with vows that have a more personal focus to the performance of the verbal-act. The result is tied to the desire of the individual and the vow is something bespoke to that person. These acts fall under a more intentional form of verbal-act. In the chapter on truth I will investigate whether the truths used in the performance of these acts must be linked to personal circumstance, whether they must appeal to a universal truth, or whether they contain a blend of both types of truth.

It is also clear that the verbal-acts used within Pali literature require that several conditions are met before the acts can be effective. The mechanisms that

allow these verbal-acts to work are similar. Protective-chants (*paritta*), truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*), and vows (*patthanā*), appear to require a certain amount of moral or individual worth. They also appear to have a connection to the truth. In the next two chapters I will investigate the importance that conduct, faith, and the truth have on the efficacy of these acts.

Chapter Three: The Role of Conduct in Verbal-Acts

The success of verbal-acts is not determined by words alone. Instead there are other determining factors that allow acts to succeed or fail. In the previous chapters there have been two factors that appear to contribute to the success of verbal-acts: the nature of the individual performing the verbal-act, and whether the statement contains the truth. This chapter will investigate how the individual performing the act can influence the efficacy of the act. I will take into consideration the type of person associated with these acts and whether there are types of conduct or behaviour associated with any of the verbal-acts this thesis focuses on.

The behaviour and conduct of individuals is important within Theravāda thought. In the Pali Canon there are several accounts of how an individual can live a life of good moral conduct. In the Eightfold path moral conduct (*sīla*) is exemplified in the performance of right speech (*sammāvācā*), right action (*sammākammanta*), and right livelihood (*sammājīva*). However, it is important to note that the other five parts of the Eightfold Path exemplify wisdom (*paññā*) and concentration (*samādhi*) which in turn promote more thoughtful, truthful, and compassionate action. Monks are governed by a stricter set of rules that are found in the Pāṭimokkha. The Pāṭimokkha contains 227 rules that outline how monks should behave. For nuns (*bhikkhunis*) this increases to 331 rules. These ensure that monks and nuns are behaving appropriately. A moral lifestyle, in the Pali Canon, can bring the individual several benefits. In the Abhisanda-Sutta (A iv 245- 247) and the Mahaparinibbāna-Sutta (D ii 71-168) the benefits of leading a moral life include wealth, a good reputation, and even a good rebirth. By behaving in such a manner, the individual develops more wholesome (*kusala*) mental states. These positive mental states in turn promote further positive action which help to develop and benefit the individual. This chapter, then, will examine how the behaviour of an individual influences the success and performance of verbal-acts within the Pali Canon.

3.1 Generosity

Merit (*puñña*) is an important concept within Buddhist thought. It is what is accumulated through good and wholesome (*kusala*) actions. The production of merit is important as it can have positive effects on the lives of individuals, generate desirable rebirths and also allows one to access higher levels of spiritual attainment. In the Puññakiriyavatthu-Sutta (A IV 146- 148) the Buddha outlines three bases of merit: generosity (*dāna*), ethical conduct (*sīla*), and meditation (*bhāvana*). For the purpose of this chapter I will investigate examples of verbal-acts that incorporate one or more of the three bases of merit. From this I will look at how the verbal-act is framed within the moral standing of the individual who performs the act.

The ability to successfully employ truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*) is often seen as a reward for virtue or positive moral actions. A clear example of meritorious behaviour being rewarded can be found within the Sivi Jātaka (Ja IV 401-412). In this story Sivi is a virtuous and kind king. He realises that he has given everything he can except his own body. The god Sakka tests the king's resolve and appears to Sivi as a *brahmin* and asks for Sivi's eyes. Sivi readily gives his eyes to Sakka. As a reward for his charity Sakka informs him that if he performs a statement of truth, his eyes will be restored:

> 'O, warrior, lord of the biped kind, declare the thing that's true: if you the truth declare, your eye shall be restored to you.'
>
> …[The king then pronounces]
>
> 'Whatever sort, whatever kind of suitor shall draw near, whoever comes to ask of me, he to my heart is dear: If these solemn words be true, now let my eye appear! A Brahmin came to visit me, one of my eyes to crave, unto that Brahmin mendicant the pair of them I gave. A greater joy and more delight that action did afford. If my solemn words be true, be the other eye restored'.
>
> (Cowell 1895-1907 IV p.255; Ja IV 409-410)

Over the course of the Jātaka the king's generosity is mentioned repeatedly. The story goes to great lengths to describe types of extreme generosity the king is

willing to perform. For the king his generosity is tied to his desire to improve and to receive the benefits of further spiritual attainments.

The act of giving one's body, or part of one's body, is typified as one of the most generous things an individual can do. The Sivi story demonstrates an extreme act of generosity. The verbal-act works in this instance because of the king's good conduct, but the act of giving is one that not many others would be able to complete. The fact that Sivi is a king is indicative of his having accrued enough merit to be a king. This is does not present an attainable verbal-act for most people. The story does, however, does become more compelling when taken as a narrative device. The generous act was performed due to a test by the deity Sakka. The intention here to is demonstrate how generous the individual is willing to be. The use of the truth-statement (*saccakiriyā*) furthers the development of the narrative. In part it is a reward for generous behaviour, but it also represents a growth (somewhat literally) of the individual in their religious practice.[20]

Giving does not always need to happen in the extreme. There are examples of verbal-acts performed in the context of food and feeding. In the Dhammapada-Atthakatha there are instances in which vows (*patthanā*) are used to demonstrate a desire to be generous and attain certain religious goals. There are, for example, several stories where an individual only has enough food to either feed themselves or to give alms. In these stories (Dhp-a II 84-85, Dhp-a III 87-95, and Dhp-a III 302-308) the vow (*patthanā*) is based on the truth that there is not enough food to be divided between two people and a wish is made that in a future life the almsgiver is able to understand the *Dhamma*. In these stories the individuals who use the verbal-act *want* to display generosity and do so to the means that they are able. In cases where the act of giving has not taken place there is the intention to give. In turn the vow (*patthanā*) is influenced by positive moral intent. What is interesting

[20] Ohnuma (2006) has written about use of the body as a gift in Indian Buddhist literature. Ohnuma (2006, pp.26-69) outlines that there are several instances in Indian literature where Sakka tests an individual by requesting a particular body part and then, once given, encourages the use of an act of truth.

to note is that the instances where vow (*patthanā*) is used in conjunction with giving the individual, or group, involved are householders. This is a more practical form of generosity (*dāna*) than the bodily mortification of King Sivi. Both the reward and the means to perform the verbal-act are suited to householders. The householders in these passages, much like Sivi, want to develop and grow. The act, or even intention, here acts as the illocutionary force. The verbal-acts, whilst having differing results, both have the same root.

3.2 Ethical Conduct

Good and ethical conduct (*sīla*) is associated with the successful outcome of verbal-acts. In many of the occurrences of verbal-acts in the Pali Canon it reads as if there is a requirement for the individual to be virtuous or moral.

The success of verbal-acts due to the moral behaviour of the individual is especially seen in the accounts of women using truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*). In the the Mūgapakkha Jātaka (Ja VI 1-30) and Suruci Jātaka (Ja 314-325) the stories focus on women who are finding it difficult to get pregnant. These women are both queens and it is mentioned several times that they are virtuous. In both examples the queens state the truth about their virtue and consequently they become pregnant. In the *Sambula Jātaka* (Ja V 88-98) and *Kanha-Dipayana* Jātaka (Ja IV 27-37) truth-statements are used by mothers and families to cure sick children. These accounts of verbal-acts are based on loyalty, fidelity, and motherhood. The women in these accounts represent idealised female behaviour. The verbal-acts work due to the women's performance of their societal duty. They are good mothers and good wives. Their association with queenship, as with the above discussion of Sivi, indicates that they already had a store of good merit. These women can be used to show other women how to develop and cultivate good behaviour.

Good moral behaviour can have far reaching results. There are accounts in the Pali Canon that discuss the ability to choose one's next birth. In the Saṅgīti-Sutta (D III 207–72) it is indicated that if a person is sufficiently moral and resolves to be reborn as a rich person or a *deva* they can achieve their aim:

> He sees a rich Khattiya or Brahmin or householder … and he thinks: "If only when I die I may be I reborn as one of these rich people!" He sets his heart on this thought, fixes it and develops it. And this thought, being launched at such a low level, and not developed to a higher level, leads to rebirth right there. But I say this of a moral person, not of an immoral one.
>
> (Walshe: 1995, p.505; D III 258-9)

Whilst not stated as a vow (*patthanā*) it is similar to the structure seen in the previous chapter. In the text this form of rebirth is in the immediate next life, not any time in the future. The vow (*patthanā*) is being used to generate a desired result. The Sankhāruppatti-Sutta (M III 99- 103) also deals with the theme of rebirth by intent. In this sutta one must possess the qualities of faith, virtue, wisdom and generosity in order to be reborn into a chosen life. This sutta also states that one can, if they have the above qualities, desire to not be reborn and attain *nibbāna*. These reflect an extreme reach of verbal-acts and as such it will take a person who has the qualities of faith, virtue, wisdom and generosity to an extreme degree to successfully perform such a verbal-act.

Whilst it might appear that vows (*patthanā*) can circumvent *kamma* it becomes apparent that this is not the case. As previously mentioned there are four basic types of *kamma* that are important at the time of death: weighty (*garuka*), proximate (*āsanna*), habitual (*āciṇṇa*), and performed (*kaṭattā*).[21] The type of death, and therefore rebirth, one has is conditioned by one's *kamma*. If one has performed a deed deemed to be 'weighty' it is that particular action that determines the state of mind of the individual at the time of death and come to fruition immediately following the rebirth as one will remember such an action. If there is a lack of such deeds then the mind will turn to actions the individual performed near death or actions they have performed regularly and condition rebirth. If the individual does not have any weighty action to come to fruition then it would be the proximate action of the vow (*patthanā*) that would be the determining factor in the rebirth. This echoes what was seen in the Milindapañha

[21] The Abhidhammatthasaṅgha (24), however, presents a different order in which the mind will turn to weighty, habitual and then proximate kamma.

(Miln I 153-4) regarding the efficacy of Protective-chants (*paritta*). In this passage it is stated that if the individual's *kamma* is weighty it would render the protective-chant ineffective. Protective-chants cannot circumvent the consequences of weighty deeds.

Not all good conduct leads to *nibbāna*. The use of morality in *paritta* texts is evident in the Maṅgala-Sutta (Khp 2-3, Sn 258-269). The word *maṅgala* has a variety of translations with 'auspicious' (Hallisey: 1995, p.413) or 'omen' (Rhys Davids: [1925] 2011, p.513) featuring prominently. *Maṅgala* is also found within Jain and Brahmanical texts. Signs and omens were used as a means of prognostication within ancient India which allowed for individuals to assess where they might encounter fortune or misfortune (Reyolds: 2016, p.344). These omens can be found in many places. In fact, many of the practices associated with the protection from arrows (*saraparittāṇa*) in the Dīgha Nikāya (D I 9) can be seen as types of prognostication, including palmistry (*aṅgavijjā*), house building lore (*vatthuvijjā*) and foretelling a person's lifespan (*pakkajjhānaṃ*). In the Maṅgala-Sutta (Khp 2-3) the Buddha is asked about good omens and he replies listing an array of virtuous qualities which include:

> Not consorting with the foolish,
> Rather with the wise consorting,
> Honouring the honourable:
> This is a supreme good omen.
>
> Ample leaning, and a craft, too,
> With a well-trained disciplining,
> Any speech that is well spoken:
> This is a supreme good omen…
>
> (Ñānamoli: 1960, p.2; Khp 3)

Hallisey (1995, p.413-414) notes that the *sutta* demonstrates not only an awareness of other religious practices but changes the imagery of omens to reflect Buddhist teachings on ethical conduct. These verses redefine omens from signs and symbols into ethical conduct, into acts that are performed. In the commentary (Khp-a 157) it

states that those who practice the cultivation of these qualities will receive protection:

> They are sorrowless, unstained and secure; and those who are secure are everywhere unvanquished and go everywhere in safety.
>
> (Ñānamoli: 1960, p.171; Khp-a 157)

Protection, then, can be the product of good conduct. The association of protective-chants (*paritta*) with good mental states suggests that the performance of protective-chants is a way of cultivating positive mental states.

3.3 Cultivation and Meditation

There are outright examples of the cultivation of positive mental factors as being the determining element for the success of verbal-acts within the Pali Canon. There are examples of protective-chants (*paritta*) used to cure illness that are associated with meditation. The Samyutta Nikāya contains three consecutive*suttas* in which the ill recite the seven factors of enlightenment (*bojjhaṅgas*) in order to get better again. These are the three identically named Gilana-Sutta (S v 79-81). In these *suttas* it is Mahākassapa, Mahāmoggalāna and the Buddha who are cured through protective-chantsThere is nothing said about the nature of their illnesses except to state that they were very ill. Harvey (1993, p.61) notes that this indicates that illness is rooted in the mind. Through listening to the teaching of the *Dhamma* the mind is transformed and the ailment is removed. In these accounts the illnesses are most likely to be *kammic* in origin. In the text the cultivation of the seven factors of enlightenment is what cures the illnesses. In modern practise these texts are regarded as protective-chants that can cure illnesses (Werner: 2013 [1993], p.61). The cultivation, or even the consideration, of these meditative practices allow the verbal-acts to be successful.

In Theravāda teachings there is an importance placed on *mettā* which is often translated as 'loving-kindness' (Rhys Davids: [1925] 2011, p.450). Loving-kindness towards all sentient beings is something that should be cultivated and is endorsed within the *suttas*. It is often described as providing protection to those who cultivate it (A II 72). Schmithausen (1997, p.41) argues that the cultivation of

loving-kindess not only causes the individual to be protected by gods and other beings, but also rendering the body invulnerable to physical harm. This form of physical protection can be seen in the Mettā-Sutta (A V 342) where there are eleven advantages that can be gained through loving-kindness:

> One sleeps happy and wakes happy; he sees no evil dreams he is dear to human beings and non-human beings alike; the devas guard him; fire, poison or sword affect him not… he makes an end without bewilderment; and if he has penetrated no further he reaches the Brahma-world.
>
> (A V 342; trans. Woodward: [1936] 1972, p.219)

The cultivation of loving-kindness is an important part of Theravāda meditative practice. The practice of this can result in rebirth in the brahma-world.[22] The inclusion of loving-kindness suggests that it is generated along with other qualities. Whilst it does generate protection for the individual it clearly has other benefits.

According to the commentary to the Khuddakapāṭha the *sutta* was said by the Buddha as a means of protection:

> Herein this Lovingkindness [Mettā] Sutta was spoken by the Blessed One, not by disciples, etc.; and that was when bhikkhus who had been harassed by deities on the slopes of the Himalayas, had gone to the Blessed One's presence; and it was uttered then at Sāvatthi as a meditation subject with the purpose of [providing] a Safeguard for those bhikkhus.
>
> (Ñānamoli: 1960, p.240; Khp-a 231-232)

It can be seen through this that the mechanism that provides protection is through the cultivation of loving-kindness. This draws an interesting parallel to the previously mentioned Ahina-Sutta (A II 72-3). It follows a similar frame story in which monks have been harassed by deities and then have been taught by the Buddha a way of protecting themselves that uses loving-kindness as a key element. Not only does loving-kindness have benefits for the individual in a sense that they have

[22] In Theravāda cosmography the brahma-world consists of twenty heavenly realms. Sixteen of these have physical form, the highest four are non-corporeal. Being reborn in these realms is achieved through significant meditative practice.

cultivated friendliness and thus act in such a positive manner, but it makes others act that way towards them. There is a slight difference in interpretation of the way in which loving-kindness can provide protection. Whilst in other sources loving-kindness can provide a physical protection there is no mention of that regarding the Karaniya-mettā-Sutta. In this case loving-kindness provides protection by warding away harm. It does this by making others friendlier towards the individual. There are parallels that can be made between the use of loving-kindness and the sympathetic magic as outlined by Frazer ([1922]1993, p.11). Here, like generates like. The loving-kindness displayed by the individual results in the potential aggressor demonstrating loving-kindness instead.

The commentary for the Ratana-Sutta (Khp-a 157-166) explains the city of Vesālī is suffering with many corpses lying in the street due to famine, as well as having pests and ogres (*yakkhas*). The Buddha arrives at the city and recites the Ratana-Sutta. He instructs Ananda to learn the *sutta* and after the Buddha finishes his recital Ananda walks around the city sprinkling water from the Buddha's alms bowl and reciting the verses. The verses Ananda chants (Khp 3-5) ask non-humans to protect the people who live in Vesālī:

> Therefore, O beings, give attention all:
> Work lovingkindness for the race of men;
> By day, by night, their offerings they bring,
> Wherefore protect them well with diligence…
>
> Glorious knower, giver, bringer of glory,
> Peerless, he taught the glorious True Ideal [Dhamma]:
> This jewel rare is in the Enlightened One:
> So may there by this very truth be safety.

(Ñānamoli: 1960, pp.4-6; Khp 3,5)

Here non-humans are encouraged into demonstrating 'loving-kindness' by providing protection for others. This is an interesting form of protective-chant (*paritta*) as it deviates from the other examples that have already been seen so far. Whilst there is a focus on loving-kindness, it is used to ensure protection through an external agent to the individual. Where in the Ahina-Sutta (A II 72-73) there is a

mutual friendliness that prevents snakes from attacking. The non-humans addressed in the Ratana-Sutta are asked not only to not attack but to watch over and provide safety for other beings. The commentary also suggests that this protective-chant works on a much larger scale than the previously discussed protective-chant. The Ratana-Sutta is understood in the commentary (Ñānamoli: 1960, p.194; Khp-a 179) to ensure that non-humans in up to 'a hundred thousand myriad world systems' will protect humans. This protective-chant, then, is very powerful.

The Āṭānāṭiya-Sutta consists of verses that were given to the Buddha as a form of protection from ogres (*yakkhas*) whilst in discussion with four kings. The Buddha sanctions these verses and states that the verses will protect all that recite it:

> Monks, you should learn these Āṭānāṭiya protective verses, master them and remember them. They are for your benefit, and through them monks and nuns, male and female lay followers may dwell guarded, protected, unharmed and at ease.
>
> (Walshe: 1995, p.478; D III 206)

It is worth noting that this protective text does not appear to extend loving-kindness toward the ogres. Schmithausen (1997, 36, n.75) states:

> It is interesting that, e.g., in the *Āṭānāṭiyasutta* . . . —a text called 'protection' (*rakkhā*) consisting of a laudatory hymn and intended to protect monks, nuns and pious lay followers… against malevolent spirits… friendship or friendliness is not mentioned as a means to pacify them. It is rather by reminding them of the superiority of the Buddha(s) and because they will otherwise be dishonoured, excluded from their community and even have their heads split by fellow-spirits...

This wouldindicate that not all protective-chants are made efficacious through the use of loving-kindness.[23] The Sumaṅgalavilāsinī (Sv 969) views the Āṭānāṭiya-

[23] The command to non-humans that features in the Āṭānāṭiya-Sutta would appear to be a much more forceful version of the request made to non-humans in the Ratana-Sutta. It also sets up the viewpoint that many of the non-humans found in the Buddhist cosmos are bound to the service of the Buddha and those who do not abide by the rules set by him can be punished.

Sutta as the most powerful protective-chant that can be used to perform exorcisms but views it as a last resort. What this suggests is that for the most part loving-kindness is a useful tool in gaining protection from non-humans but in the most extreme cases this will not work and instead a more forceful method is needed. This is a reminder that the Buddha is more powerful and that there will be a loss of status or even life at the hands of those charged to protect Buddhists.

3.4 Merit and Bad Behaviour

In the above verbal-acts have worked due to the outward expression of wholesome (*kusala*) actions. However, in the Pali Canon there are accounts where the opposite appears to be happening and negative behaviours are seemingly rewarded with successful verbal-acts.

As noted above those who are not considered to be moral appear to be able to use truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*) if they admit or acknowledge their misdeeds. In the Kanha-dipayana Jātaka (Ja X 27-37) there is a sick child who is at the point of death. The child's mother and father both use the truth that they are unhappy with their current roles in life as a form of truth-statement. The use of truth-statements by those who would appear unworthy is further supplemented by an ascetic who also expresses a truth about his failings and disappointment to help save the child. The ascetic, husband and mother all use their failings and feelings as the truth and it is revealed that they all go on to become much better people. Likewise, the former serial killer Aṅgulimāla (M ii 97-105) uses the truth about his murderous past combined with an acknowledgement about his new life as a monkto help with the birth.

Whilst the above examples suggest that the individuals are able to successfully perform verbal-acts whilst being unmoral this might not necessarily be the case. Especially within the use of truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*) by Aṅgulimāla. Whilst Aṅgulimāla had previously been a murderer, he had renounced that part of himself and had become a follower of the Buddha before he uses the verbal-act. Aṅgulimāla is a member of the *Saṅgha* when he performs the truth-statement. His

truth even acknowledges the fact that he has indeed changed. Likewise, the parents are admitting their failures and seek to change. In the next chapter I will be investigating whether the act of telling the truth is in and of itself a moral act. If so, this would suggest that the above examples are in fact examples of good, rather than bad, conduct.

Conclusion

The use of verbal-acts to effect change requires more than the utterance of words. The performer must meet certain conditions for the act to succeed. There appear to be differing levels of outcome for verbal-act depending on the moral character and acts of the individual. There is a spectrum of behaviour displayed. The verbal-acts which have a large outcome, such as new eyes or enlightenment, are supplemented with a vast amount of moral worth and merit. The individuals who use these verbal-acts are extraordinary. These verbal-acts can be used as narratives to demonstrate the benefits of good conduct. The other forms of verbal-act, those associated with loving-kindness and generosity are more attainable, and viable, forms of verbal-act. These acts are often performed by householders and in turn reflect the aspirations that other householders reading or listening to the text might have. They become a model for good conduct.

Chapter Four: Universal and Personal Truths

In the previous chapter the focus was on the effect that the conduct of an individual makes on the efficacy of verbal-acts. As noted previously, verbal-acts require more than words to be successful. In this chapter I will turn my attention towards the use of the truth to aid in the successful performance of verbal-acts. The truth, as this chapter will show, is not limited to profound statements. The types of truth used in verbal-acts found in the Pali Canon are varied. Some expound the nature of reality and the way things really are. Others focus on the individual and truths that are uniquely personal to them.

Truth (s*acca*) is an important concept in Indian traditions. In Vedic traditions there is a high value placed on the truth (Sanskrit: *satya*). It is commonly associated with the concept of natural order and duty (Sanskrit: *ṛta*). The truth is what keeps the natural order of the universe in place. This concept of truth develops into a more ethical concept when applied to individuals. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, I.4.xiv (Mādhavānanda: 1950, p.178) it is noted that:

> Therefore there is nothing higher than that [Dharma]. Even a weak man hopes (to defeat) a stronger man through righteousness, as (one contending) with the king. That righteousness is verily truth. Therefore they say " about a person speaking of truth, 'He speaks of righteousness,' or about a person speaking of righteousness, 'He speaks of truth,' for both these are but righteousness.

There is a connection between truth and correct behaviour. Truthfulness is a desirable quality in the individual. The connection between truth, conduct, and duty is not exclusive to Vedic traditions and in this chapter I will provide exploration of this concept in Theravāda sources.

The truth is powerful and according to Söhnen-Thieme (1995, pp.235-6) it can be used to produce certain results. In non-Buddhist ancient Indian texts such as the Yoga Sūtras, which were compiled around 400BCE and provide a guide to *yoga* practices, there are also examples of the truth being used to generate desired results. In Yoga Sūtra 2.36 (Bryant: 2009, pp.262-3) it is stated that: “when one is firmly established in speaking truth, the fruits of action become subservient to

him."[24] The truth can be used in order to create desired outcomes. For example, in the Atharvaveda (AV 4.18.1) the truth is used in order to protect against witchcraft:

> Night is like unto the sun, the (starry) night is similar to day. The truth do I engage for help: the enchantments shall be devoid of force!...
>
> The person that prepares evil at home, and desires it to harm another, she is consumed by fire, and many stones fall upon her with a loud crash.
>
> (Bloomfield [1897] 1964 p.70; A V 4.18.1,3)

The Arthavaveda, as noted in the previous chapter, is a collection of spells and formula that can be used in a range of circumstances. The magical reputation of this text is important to note here. The truth is highlighted as a contributing factor for the success of this spell and has similarities to truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*). The use of the truth to bring about results is also found in the epic Sanskrit poetry. In the Rāmāyaṇa there is an example of the truth being used to bring a person back from the dead:

> Never have I spoken an untruth nor turned from battle; as virtue is dear to me, by this truth this boy, though dead, shall live again… as truth and virtue are firmly established in me, so, though dead, this boy shall live again.
>
> (Hopkins 1932, pp.318-319; R 14.69.19-22)

This stands in stark contrast to the pronouncement in the Milindapañha (Miln I 150-154) that the dead cannot be resurrected through verbal-acts. However, it is important to recognise the high value of truth in ancient India.

The truth does not always have to pertain to a quality to be useful either. Knowing the name, or true nature, of a being is to control it. This is not specifically Buddhist and is found in other traditions as well. Words, in this context, portray the truth. By speaking the truth the individual can use it to manifest a desired result. In the Ṛgveda (RV 10.62.2) the name of a group of cows is used to free them

[24] Bryant (2009, pp.262-263) goes into more detail about the commentarial analysis on this statement. There is debate in the various commentaries about whether generated results are instantaneous or come to fruition later.

from being stuck. This use of names will be explored in a Theravāda context later in the chapter.

The use of truth in verbal-acts is an important factor in their success. Truth is used to demonstrate the types of ideals that are reflected in the desired outcome of the truth-act. The above sources have focused on Vedic traditions and the epics. This is important as it provides a context for the framework of verbal-acts found within the Pali Canon. The pre-Buddhist ideas about the efficacy of truth can be seen reflected in the way truth is used in the Pali Canon. However, the Pali Canon presents these truth-based acts in line with Buddhist ideology; the acts might appear similar but work in a way that reflects Buddhist, not Vedic teaching. What this chapter will examine in the types of truth used and whether this determines what type of verbal-act is used.

4.1 Truth and Speech

It would be prudent to begin with an exploration of the relationship between the truth and speech. Previously I have discussed how good conduct is tied to truthful speech. Speech should be conducted in a thoughtful way that considers those being addressed. Being truthful is an important element of correct speech.

Truth can take many forms. In the examples of truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*) in chapter two the truth used is a present truth for the individual. In the Cariyāpiṭaka (Horner: 1975, p.41; Cp.9) a quail uses the present truth that "wings there are that fly not, feet there are that walk not. Mother and father are gone away…" as part of their truth-statement. However, speaking truthfully can also include following through on a statement made. In the Darasaratha Jātaka (JA 123-130) there is a clear example of truth being adhered to. A king is worried that his second wife will kill his son. After visiting an ascetic the king is told he will die in twelve years. The king makes the prince leave and the prince states that he will not return until twelve years have passed. The prince does not return after his father dies, but waits another three years until the twelve years have passed. The son is

not willing to make a false promise. He promised to stay away for twelve years and the text presents him as virtuous for doing so. The story highlights that the son respected his father's wish and he performed his duty by keeping the promise. The spoken word is presented as having a binding nature. The spoken nature of vows and promises can be seen in the recitation of the two-hundred and twenty-seven rules (*pāṭimokkha*) that full ordained monks adhere to.[25] By speaking these rules the monks are bound to their promise to follow these rules. There is an intermingling of speech, duty, and truth.

The use of earnest-wishes (*patthanā*) also incorporates a vow in its structure. It is a true-statement followed by a wish or vow. In this the spoken desire of the individual becomes something that needs to be fulfilled, almost as if it were a duty.

> "You have killed me!.. It was you alone that brought me here; it was you alone that killed my three children. Now I also am going to die. When I have passed out of this existence, may I be reborn as an ogress able to devour your children"
>
> (Burlingame: [1921]1969 I p.172: Dhp-a 46)

Whilst this example does not portray a pleasant use of an earnest-wish it does show a correlation between the truth and a vow. In this text a woman has been murdered by her rival and states the truth about the circumstance of her death. She vows to enact revenge on her rival by eating the rival's children. The truth used interrelates with the vow made. There are other factors that need to be met for the vow to work, but nonetheless the spoken aspect of the vow is important. The individual who uses the earnest-wish (*patthanā*) does not merely think that they want to reach a certain goal, they vocalise it. The spoken part of an earnest-wish *(patthanā),* much like protective-chants *(paritta*) and truth-statements *(saccakiriyā*) is important. The act of speech is part of the ritual aspect of these verbal-acts. This ties back to Austin ([1962]2009). The act of speaking is the outward sign of a performative act taking place, but there are other contributing factors. The conduct and moral worth of an individual can affect the efficacy of verbal-acts. In this

[25] For a more in-depth discussion see Holt (1981, pp.129-130).

chapter the use of the truth can determine the success of the act. In the performance of earnest-wishes (*patthanā*) the individual's spoken declaration is linked to the truth. The wish or aspiration of the individual is a truth. It is a revelation of their truthful desires and wants.

The spoken word of the individual is a significant part of verbal-acts. There is a correlation between the speech used in verbal-acts and the truth of the individual's status, or their duty, or even their desires. The link between truth and speech is seen more explicitly in the speech of the Buddha. Saddhatissa (1991: pp.125-138) notes "great power in the words that came out of the mouth of the Buddha". The spoken word, as previously discussed is powerful, but the word of the Buddha is extremely powerful. Part of this is because the Buddha's speech is directly linked to truth. What the Buddha taught is known as the *Dhamma*; it is the true nature of reality. It is explicitly stated that the Buddha and the *Dhamma* are the same (S III 119). The teachings of the Buddha are rooted in truth. Trainor (1997, p.48) suggests that protective-chants (*paritta*) are effective because they are considered to be the recitation of the Buddha's true speech.

4.2 Universal Truths

The teaching of the Buddha (*Dhamma*) is understood to reveal the true nature of the universe. This truth is potent. The Buddha became enlightened upon realising this truth, and then taught this to others to help them attain liberation. However, the truth about the nature of the universe is not always used to reap a soteriological reward. It can be broken down into smaller truths and can be used in verbal-acts without requiring the individual to be enlightened. There are examples of universal truths being used in verbal-acts throughout the Pali Canon. Referencing truths about the Buddha, his teaching, and even about natural laws, can all be used to render verbal-acts successful.

One of the clearest ways in which the Buddha's teaching is used to generate results is through the use of protective-chants (*paritta*). Protective-chants both in textual and modern practice use teachings of the Buddha as the basis of the verbal-

act. In its most simple form protective-chants (*paritta*) are a recitation of *suttas* or verses from the Pali Canon. They are often used for protection.[26] In many of the *suttas* that are recognised as protective-chanting texts there is a direct reference to the *Dhamma* or a specific teaching. In the Dhammapada-Atthakatha (Dhp-a II 235-239) there is a story in which the Buddha recommends the use of protective-chants in order to save a boy whose life was being threatened by an ogre (*yakka*) who would be coming in 7 days. The Buddha told the family to build a pavilion and he would bring his monks to come and chant for the sake of the child. The recitation of the texts lasted seven days. On the final day the Buddha came and joined the chanting. On the eighth day when the ogre came to take the child it was unable to do so. In the Ratana-Sutta (Khp 3-5) the Buddha also recommends the use of chanting to overcome a hardship. The verses used not only reference the Buddha and his teaching, but directly explain that the truth being used is the mechanism that provides safety:

> Therefore, O beings, give attention all:
> Work lovingkindness for the race of men;
> By day, by night, their offerings they bring,
> Wherefore protect them well with diligence…
>
> Glorious knower, giver, bringer of glory,
> Peerless, he taught the glorious True Ideal [Dhamma]:
> This jewel rare is in the Enlightened One:
> So may there by this very truth be safety.
>
> (Ñānamoli: 1960, pp.4-6; Khp 3,5)

In this *sutta* the city of Vesali is besieged by ogres and pestilence. This verbal-act is used to alleviate the situation.[27] In these examples there is an outside threat that is solved by using verbal-acts. The request for loving-kindness (*mettā*) is tied into

[26] Cf. Saddhatissa: 1991, p. 125; De Silva: 1981, p.139.
[27] In this instance of *paritta* there is also water sprinkled around the city whilst the chanting is taking place. The use of water is found in modern *paritta* rituals. For further information see: Samuels, 2005: pp.339-367; De Silva, 1980.

larger truths about the nature of the *Dhamma*. In both examples the Buddha explicitly links his teaching and the truth to the use of protective verbal-acts.

Throughout the Pali Canon and its commentaries there are many examples of protective-chants (*paritta*) that reference a form of truth being used to provide some form of protection from harm, illness, or as a prophylactic device. The Buddha himself is shown to employ *paritta* for his own benefit during a period of sickness. In the Gilana-Sutta (S v 79-81) the Buddha falls ill and asks Mahacunda to recite the seven factors of enlightenment (*bojjhaṅgas*) to him. The use of the Buddha's teachings in this context highlights the power of truth, but also the need to express this out loud. The Buddha could have simply remembered or thought of the seven factors of enlightenment, but instead he required them to be spoken to him. Hearing, or speaking, the truth is highlighted as a powerful act.

It is not just protective-chants (*paritta*) that use universal truths to ensure that verbal-acts are effective. There are examples found within the Pali Canon of this type of truth being used in order to make truth-statements (*saccakiriyā*) successful. In the Cariyāpiṭaka there are two accounts of truth-statements being used. In both there are direct references made to the true nature of the universe. The first occurrence appears in the story of a fish king who uses the truth in order to protect fellow fish from being eaten by birds as a drought has reduced the water levels:

> Having recollected the true Dhamma, considering the highest good, I made an asseveration of truth that would be lasting, eternal in the world:
>
> "As long as I (can) remember about myself, ever since I have come to (years of) discretion I am not aware of having hurt intentionally even one living thing. By this utterance of truth may Pajjunna pour down rain. Thunder, Pajjuna! Destroy the treasure trove of the crows, besiege the crows with grief, set free the fishes from grief."
>
> (Horner: 1975; Cp.10)

In this instance the truth-statement works in part due to the fish referencing a universal truth and using a personal truth. The reference to the universal truth is

important to consider as the part of the Cariyāpiṭaka that both accounts are from is focused on the perfection of truth (*saccapāramitā*). The truth is exemplified as one of the qualities that should be developed by all Buddhists. The other account of a truth-statement shows a quail who saves itself from a fire using a universal truth followed by the truth about being abandoned by its parents:

> Reflecting on the power of Dhamma, remembering former Conquerors, relying on the power of truth, I made an asseveration of truth:
>
> "Wings there are that fly not, feet there are that walk no. Mother and father are gone away Jātaveda, recede."
>
> (Horner: 1975, p.41; Cp.9)

Here the quail references not only the *Dhamma* but previous Buddhas to help the verbal-act succeed. In both instances the protagonist references the *Dhamma* and then use an act of truth. Universal truths, here, are being used in a way that can be likened to sympathetic magic. It is a like for like formula. As one truth is powerful it follows that the second truth is powerful too, as if the verbal-act draws its power from its similarity to the truth.

The instances of truth being used in a sympathetic way to make verbal-acts efficacious can also be seen when nature is referenced as a truth. Söhnen-Thieme (1995, p.235) notes that truth-acts are reliant on an understanding that there is a "congruence of statements and corresponding fact". Likewise, Bronkhorst (1996; 2013) calls this a "correspondence theory" and notes the use of truth-statements that are in some way representative of the situation the speaker seeks to bring about. There is an isomorphic relationship between truth-statements and the resolution that they bring about.[28] Hacker (1959: p.96) refers to this form of verbal-act as "analogiezauber [analogy magic]". This form of verbal-act can be seen when used in relation to nature. In the Petavatthu Atthakatha (Pv-a 23-24) there is a passage that is used for the transfer of merit:[29]

[28] The use of verbal-acts and truth in this way is not limited to Theravada Buddhism. Kaufmann (2017: p.19) explores this in relation to Shingon Buddhism.
[29] For more on the transfer of merit see Keyes: 1983, pp.261-286, Langer: 2007, pp.165-180, Gombrich: [1971] 2009 pp.251-285, and Ladwig, 2012: pp.119-141.

With gifts from here, the petas, the dead in the other world, maintain themselves.
As water rained on a height flows down to the low ground,
even so the gift hence given supports the petas.
Just as full, streams of water fill the ocean,
even so the gift hence given supports the peta

(Gehman: 1974, p.115; Pv-a 23-234)

There is a relationship between the transfer of merit and the water that flows into the ocean. By associating the truth of the water's flow with the transfer of merit, the merit flows from the speaker to the dead. McDermott (1975: p.427) notes that the act of speaking is very important to the success of the transfer. There are other instances in the Pali Canon and its commentaries where this type of formula is used in the form of an earnest-wish (*patthanā*). In the Buddhavamsa (BV ii 88.181, 185-187) there are verses that link natural processes to future attainments:

As creepers and trees were fruit-bearing then, all these are fruiting too today.
Assuredly you will be a Buddha…
As the moon shines clear on a full-moon night, so do you shine fully in the ten thousand.

(Horner: 1975, p.185; BV ii 88)

These verses follow a similar logic to the Petavatthu that as one statement is true it follows that the second statement is true. The imagery used is also analogous to the desired outcome. Fruit, for example, references attainment. In the Dhammapada-Atthakatha (Dhp-a I 198, ii 92) there are similar truths to those mentioned above. These are given by a Buddha, or solitary-buddha (*paccekabuddha*), after a vow (*patthanā*) has been made in front of them:

May all you've wished and prayed for come out well;
May all your aspirations be fulfilled, even as the moon at the full.
May all you've wished and prayed for come out well;
May all your aspirations be fulfilled, as by the jewel Dew of Light.

(Burlingame: [1921]1969, p.274; Dhp-a I 198)

It should be noted that these are not as explicit as the other references but a clear correlation is made between nature, in this case the moon, and the positive result of the person who made the wish.

The relationship between knowing a name and controlling events is also found within the Pali Canon. The Ahina-Sutta (A II 72-3) is a good example of this as it incorporates a number of truths. In this *sutta* it is the Buddha who advocates the use of protective-chants (*paritta*) as a way of providing protection from being harmed by snakes. Firstly, there is reference to the names of the four snake families.

> I have loving-kindness for the *virūpakkha* snakes; for the *erāpatha* snakes I have loving-kindness. I have loving-kindness for the *chabyāputta* snakes; for the black *gotamakas* I have loving-kindness.
>
> (Bodhi: 2012, pp.456-7; A II 72-73)

This has a similarity to the practices found in the Vedas of naming a deity as a means of calling its attention and using it to work a truth-statement (cf. AV. 6.56; AV 5.13). By showing kindness to the snakes in this verbal-act it is followed by the hope that snakes will return this kindness. Secondly, this protective-chant also draws on truths involving the power of the Buddha and his teaching:

> The Buddha is measureless, the Dhamma is measureless, the Saṅgha is measureless; creeping things, snakes, scorpions, centipedes, spiders, lizards, and rats are finite. I have made a safeguard, I have made protection. Let the creatures retreat. I pay homage to the Blessed One, homage to the seven Perfectly Enlightened Ones.
>
> (Bodhi: 2012, pp.456-7; A II 72-73)

This statement is at the very end of the protective-chant. It highlights the strength of the Buddha, his teaching, and his followers, and uses these truths to ensure the safety of humans against dangerous animals. The power of this truth is incorporated into the power of the verbal-act.

So far, I have examined how the truths used are understood, or at least the words are comprehended by the individual speaking them and the audience who

hears them. However, it is worth noting that understanding the truth that has been spoken is not always necessary. The focus of this thesis has primarily been that of analysing verbal-acts as they appear in textual sources. However, verbal-acts in modern anthropology have been viewed as a performance in public, the meaning of the truths and texts used are not always clear to the audience. Greene (2004: p.44) highlights this difference in view "whereas literary scholars tend to examine *paritta* meanings and not sounds, anthropologists conversely model *parittas* effectively as sounds without meanings: i.e., spells." This is not a new phenomenon in modern Buddhist practice. There are examples (albeit non-human) of audiences benefiting from hearing the truth of the Buddha's teaching without understanding the words spoken. In the Dhammapada-Atthakatha (Dhp-a III 224) five-hundred bats benefit from the recitation of the Abhidhamma. It is made clear that the bats do not understand what was being said, instead they are enthralled by the monks' voices. When the bats died they were reborn as gods (*devas*) due to their enjoyment of the sound of truth. Likewise, in the Visuddhimagga (Vism 208) a frog who listened to the Buddha preaching and was pleased by the sounds. The frog then dies and is immediately reborn in the Tāvatiṃsa heaven.[30] Both these stories suggest that hearing the truth, no matter if the words are understood, acts as a form of verbal-act. [31]

4.3 Personal Truths

Truth does not just encompass that which defines the universe. It can be on a more personal level. There are examples in the Pali Canon and its commentaries of personal truths being used to drive the success of verbal-acts. Unlike protective texts (*paritta* texts) that have a standard formula the verbal-acts that use personal truths are more bespoke. That is not to say that there is not a basic structure to such verbal-acts. Burlingame (1917, p.429) notes that for truth-statements the individual must relay a personal truth and follow it with an exact command or

[30] See Langer 2007: p. 45ff these stories and how the sounds were the sense object at mind at the moment of death (*kammanimitta*).

[31] Greene (2004, p. 48) notes that there is some scepticism about whether sound and speech is a stable or useful way to transmit the truth. Sound and language are not static in interpretation. He argues that use of sound and speech to convey the truth can degrade and lose meaning. Cf. Kalupahana: 1992, pp.60-63.

purpose. Likewise, earnest-wishes are a truth followed by the outcome that the individual desires.

There are, in the Pali Canon, a range of individuals who use truths to achieve a successful act of truth (*saccakiriyā*). In the Milindapañha (Miln. I 119-124) King Milinda asks Nagasena about the nature of truth-acts (*saccakiriyā*), specifically who can make them work. In his reply Nagasena tells the story of the courtesan Bindumatī using a truth-act to make the Ganges flow against the current. She does this after witnessing the King and his attendants fail to get an act of truth to work. When King Asoka found out she did this he asked how she could perform a truth-act when she is indecent and evil. She replies that even a person as immoral as she is can perform a truth-act (*saccakiriyā*). Her truth relates to the fact that she is not ashamed of her profession nor does she resent it. It is stated again by Nagasena that those who hold fast to their truth will be able to perform such acts. The ethos of this story is that truth-acts can be used by anyone. However, it is also important to note that Bindumatī may have been successful because her personal truth links to her role in society. Her acceptance of her position as a courtesan is what allows her verbal-act to be successful after witnessing the unsuccessful attempts of others.

In the previous chapter it was noted that moral worth is needed for verbal-acts to be successful. The success of seemingly less virtuous people to perform verbal-acts does not necessarily conflict with this requirement. Brown (1972b, pp.252-268) argues that the truths used by such people reflect their duty and their performance of their duty. In the Kanha-dīpāyana Jātaka (Ja IV 27-37) there is an example of people making a truth-statement that seemingly references their wrong thought and wrong action. In this Jātaka a child is sick due to a snake-bite and his mother and father ask an ascetic to help them by performing an act of truth. The ascetic declares that he has lived for the past fifty years self-absorbed and not wanting to be an ascetic. This is not enough to draw all the poison out, so the father is instructed to tell a truth. His truth is that he resents the fact that he has to entertain and feed people who ask it of him. This works to a degree but is not enough to draw out all of the poison and so the mother is instructed to tell a truth.

Her truth is that she is indifferent to her husband and not in love with him. Once she has stated her truth the child is recovered from the snake-bite. They do however show positive behaviour in the respect that they all have performed their duty well and others were not aware of their dissatisfaction. The truths here are deeply personal. It is interesting to note that the parents and monk resolve to become better people after the truths are said aloud. There is an intermingling of truth and duty.

This type of duty-based truth and performance can be seen in other accounts of verbal-acts where the individual is seen to be more moral and virtuous. In the Mūgapakkha Jātaka (Ja VI 1-30) and Suruci Jātaka (Ja 314-325) the stories focus on women who have struggled to get pregnant. These women are both queens and it is mentioned several times that they are virtuous. It is through stating the truth about their virtue that they become pregnant. In the Sambula Jātaka (Ja V 88-98) Sambula was the consort of the king and their son developed leprosy.[32] This leprosy could not be cured by the various physicians that attended to him and it caused him such distress that he left to go and live in the wilderness. Sambula went with her son so that she could attend to him. However, an ogre (*yakkha*) fell in love with her and tried to capture her. Through her virtue the god Sakka rescued her. When she returned to the prince he doubted her story and so she used the truth to prove that she loves no man more than she loves her son and she then uses this truth to cure him of his leprosy. Both her virtue and her love for her son are used as the truth in this instance. In these examples the women are performing their duties as wives and as mothers. Duty and societal responsibility interplay with the truths that are used to create successful verbal-acts.

In the Pali Canon there is evidence that the truths used in verbal-acts correlate with the desired outcome. Correlating truths make more sense in the context of narrative and storytelling. A good example of this of the act of truth used by Aṅgulimāla. In the text Aṅgulimāla (M ii 103) saves the life of a woman who is

[32] Leprosy, as far as I have found, is not believed to be caused by *yakkhas*. In many Indian sources it is linked to the individual committing murder in a previous life. Rastogi and R.C. Rastogi (1984, pp.541-543) provide an interesting examination of the perception and some cures for leprosy in ancient India.

having difficulty during childbirth when he asserts that since he has entered into the noble birth he has not intentionally killed any living beings and uses this to assist a woman in labour:

> Sister, since I was born with the noble birth, I do not recall that I have ever intentionally deprived a living being of life. By this truth, may you be well and may your infant be well.
>
> (Ñānamoli and Bodhi: 1995 p.714; M ii 103)

In this *sutta* Aṅgulimāla goes from being a mass murderer to a monk and ultimately dies an *arahat*. The truth he uses comes from his status and position in his new life as a monk. His transition from death to life mirrors the near death of the mother and the new life of the baby. Aṅgulimāla here has gone from the bringer of death to the supporter of life. Secondly, truths that are isomorphic with the intended result follow the sympathetic nature of the verbal-acts that derive efficacy from universal truths. The truth about Aṅgulimāla's new life is linked to the lives of the mother and child.

There is debate about whether the truth used in truth-acts (*saccakiriyā*) needs to pertain to the desired outcome. Lüders (1951, pp.17-19) argues that the truth is enough and does not need to be connected to the intended result. This could be possible; there are uses of the truth that do not appear to correlate to the desired result. In the Milindapañha (Miln. I 122) the courtesan Bindumatī uses the truth that she treats her clients equally and is not offended by her line of work to change the flow of the Ganges. However, on a closer reading it could be interpreted that she inverts the flow of the Ganges because in her truth she inverts social order. In her statement she says: "… I minister to each in the same manner not thinking there is any special elegance in a noble or anything contemptible in a worker" (Horner: 1963 p.171; Miln. I 122). The fact that the truth-statement is often not included in the text means that it is hard to verify Lüders' claims either way. Hacker (1959, p.97) disagrees with Lüders and states that the truth used in acts of truth (*saccakiriyā*) is important to the success of the verbal-act. There is certainly evidence for this, but as I noted before, there is no way to fully verify either claim. It

makes more sense narratively for the truths to connect to the desired outcome. This way there is a clear picture made between cause and effect, and would help to extend teachings and metaphors.

Verbal-acts are not rendered successful through the use of a personal truth or a universal truth alone. It is clear in the examples that I have used that these types of truth are not mutually exclusive in the use of verbal-acts. There are also times where the individual uses their truth about their inability to fully understand or live by the teachings of the Buddha to work a verbal-act. In the Dhammapada-Atthakatha there are examples of where earnest-wishes (*patthanā*) are used in order to express a desire to attain certain religious goals. In Dhp-a I 8 it is explained that the Sāriputta became a disciple of the Buddha using an earnest-wish. In a previous life he had encountered a buddha teaching but did not consider himself to have the requisite properties to become enlightened. He expressed a truth in the fact that he does not want to be reborn as a deity but instead desires to be the chief disciple of a buddha. In the same story it is explained that Moggallana also makes an earnest-wish to become a disciple of a buddha. In these examples the truths are based on a personal truth that will eventually give them an understanding of universal truths.

Conclusion

The truth is extremely important in Indian religions. As Brown (1972, p.260) notes truth is "the Vedic virtue par excellence" and this valuing of the truth as a positive action is found in the Pali Canon as well. Speaking the truth is a positive act. Truthful speaking appears in the Eightfold Path, in the Pāṭimokkha, and is noted as a virtuous behaviour throughout the Pali Canon. In the previous chapter it was noted that good and moral behaviour is a requirement for verbal-acts to work. Speaking truthfully is a moral act in Theravāda thought. Using the truth in a verbal-act, especially if it pertains to personal acts and worth, can be seen as a virtuous act in and of itself, even if the individual does not necessarily appear to be a good person.

The examples in this chapter show how the truth is important in the performance of verbal-acts. The Buddha's teachings are salvific regardless of whether they are being used in a verbal-act or whether they are being used to educate. The power of universal truths is often reflected in the presentation of the verbal-act. If the verbal-act is being used to protect people from harm from other beings, the Buddha and his teaching are shown as a strength, as conquerors, as immense and infinite. If the verbal-act is being used to cure illness and injury references are made to the Buddha's teachings as bringing new life and rejuvenation. The truths often relate to the desired outcome and can be linked to sympathetic magic.

The use of personal truths provides a link to personal duties and social expectations. Mothers are aided by verbal-acts that reference their unwavering love in their children when the children are at risk. Virtuous women are saved from suspicious husbands and neighbours by stating truths about their fidelity. Even when the verbal-acts that are being used by people who are not considered to be upstanding citizens the personal truths reflect the individual's acceptance of their position and their nature. The truth-acts as a dynamic element of verbal-acts. Truths used in verbal-acts are the sympathetic force that gives power to the wish or demand of the speaker.

Conclusion

Since the latter half of the twentieth century there has been an increased academic interest in whether the term magic should be used. As noted in the introduction to this thesis there is no consistent definition of magic as a category. The central themes of this debate are focused on whether magic is a reliable technical term due to its multifarious definitions as well as concerns that it cannot seen as an objective term due to negative connotations. Regardless of this debate, magic is still used by anthropologists working on Theravāda Buddhism. Scholars working in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Spiro (1970, p.159), view supernormal acts that have worldly or mundane outcomes as being magical in nature. In these sources there is the view that these acts as later additions to Theravāda practice, and ones that are added as a tool to placate the lay communities. However, toward the end if the twentieth century and in more recent scholarship, this focus has changed to allow a more nuanced evaluation of the performance and purpose of these acts. Scholars such as McDaniels (2011), Reynolds (2016), and Terwiel (2012) have all engaged with magic as being a legitimate part of Theravāda practice. Terwiel (2012, p.36) notes that in his study “no distinction is made between religion and magic, the latter is seen as part of the reach field of religion as a whole". McDaniels (2011, pp.6-7) goes as far as to note that in the study of Chinese and Tibetan Buddhism magic is more readily accepted as a religious practice, but in a Theravāda context this has not been the case. What this demonstrates is that there is still a need for anthropologists and ethnographers of Theravāda Buddhism to engage with such practices and explore how they fit within existing religious frameworks.

The need for continuing examination of magical acts in Theravāda Buddhism is also needed within scholarship that analyse the Pali Canon and other Theravāda texts. There has been some engagement, as seen in the work of Blackburn (1999), but there are very few studies that are exclusively devoted to this subject. There is a tension about the use of magical acts within the Pali Canon. Scholars such as Swearer (1987) and Granoff (1996) note that the use of supernormal acts are both encouraged and discouraged in the Pali Canon. In the Kevaddha-Sutta (D I 211-223) the Buddha reflects on the fact that if he or a monk (*bhikkhu*) were to perform

supernormal acts to demonstrate their power it could misconstrued as a spell that non-Buddhists could use. The Buddha outlines three categories of supernormal acts: psychic-powers that arise from meditative accomplishments (*iddhi*), telepathy (*ādesanā*), and teaching the *Dhamma* (*anusāsanī*). The warnings about the use of magical acts in the Pali Canon are in place to make sure that such acts are used appropriately and in a way that will not dishonour or discredit the Buddha.

Another branch of textual scholars, such as Fiordalis (2010), Gomez (2010) and Gethin (2011), engage with what they describe as 'miracles'. Gomez (2010, p.541) classifies miracles as being "caused or performed by buddhas and bodhisattvas, who somehow interfere in the normal order of things, and whose magical acts and the fruits thereof are considered to be somehow superior or radically different from those of other teachers and wonderworkers." These acts are typified by being superior in nature to the acts of non-Buddhist agents. Fiordalis (2010) continues this by using miracle as a means of differentiating between acts that meet religious requirements and those that do not. There, however, remains a sense of ambiguity around these terms. Fiordalis (2010, p.383) reflects upon this stating that both the terms magic and miracle "exist within a constellation of concepts that includes the natural and supernatural, divine and diabolical, as well as science and religion". In these analyses supernormal acts are linked to meditative achievement and the development of psychic power (*iddhi*). This engagement is important, but largely focuses on the Buddha and his enlightened followers (*arahants*). The acts presented do not reflect the array of acts used within the Pali Canon. Separating acts into miracle and magic creates a dichotomy between an idealised notion of religious behaviour and presents all other forms of supernormal act as irreligious or lesser in value. There needs to be more engagement with magic and practices that have a worldly outcome in textual scholarship.

Throughout this thesis it is made clear that the term magic is difficult to define. Magic is not a static category and instead there are several actions and practices that could be classified as being magical. The term magic has always encompassed a range of practices. It has a place within the study of religion, but, it should be used with care.

The separation of magic and religion is not useful in the study of Buddhism. It does not reflect the texts or the reality of Buddhism as practised today. Definitions of magic are not clear or uniform, but the verbal-acts presented in this thesis do share many of the qualities associated with magic. They are supernormal acts in which the individual, or group can change the world around them. Not only are these acts used but they are actively recommended in certain situations. The Buddha recommends protective-chants (*paritta*) on several occasions including snakebites (A II 72-3), protection from ogres (D iii 195-202), and to cure sickness (S v 79-81). The inclusion of these acts in the Pali Canon, and commentarial and post-canonical literature, shows their importance. The verbal-acts examined in this thesis appear in the post-canonical text the Milindapañha (Miln I 119-124, 150-155), with protective-chants (*paritta*) and truth-acts (*saccakiriyā*) having dedicated chapters show the conditions for success and the limitations. The verbal-acts found in this thesis can also be found in modern Theravāda practice. By looking at research into recent Theravāda Buddhist practice it becomes clear that variants of these acts are still being used and are seen by those practising as religious acts. Protective-chants (*paritta*) have been observed in the works of Terwiel (2012), de Silva (1981), Langer (2007), McDaniels (2011), and Patton (2012). In these sources protective-chants are considered by those practicing them to be religious. The fact that verbal-acts are found throughout the Pali Canon and post-canonical sources demonstrates the longevity of these acts. Verbal-acts are not marginal nor are they late additions to Buddhist practice.

The argument for the separation of seemingly magical acts from religious acts has been based on the motivation of such acts. Spiro (1970) and Gombrich (2009 [1971]), for example, view verbal-acts as being a later addition used to placate uneducated lay people. These acts focus on worldly and individualistic results. They do not perform a soteriological function. In this thesis this point of view has been shown to be an assumption. Vows (*patthanā*) can be used to further the religious goals of an individual for example. Just because an act is not soteriological in outcome it does not mean that the act is not religious.

The use of verbal-acts to create change is not unique to Theravāda Buddhist practice or the Pali Canon. Verbal-acts had long been part of the religious landscape of ancient India (Yelle: 2013). The verbal-acts presented in the Pali Canon show a change in attitude towards the source of power of verbal-acts. In Vedic acts the source of power derives from the use of the correct words from those with sufficient ritual purity (Flood: 1996, pp.219-220). In the Pali Canon, these acts are no longer in the domain of the elite and no longer require the same degree of purity. Instead, verbal-acts gain their power through the behaviour of the individual. This is clearly shown in the example of truth-acts (*saccakiriyā*) in the Milindapañha (Miln. I 119-124). The example of the courtesan changing the direction of the Ganges after the failure of the King and his advisers is used to show that truth and the acceptance of duty form the basis of a successful act. The behaviour of the individual rather than their birth is important for the outcome of verbal-acts. This makes verbal-acts more accessible. Individuals do not need to be high caste or speak a ritual language. Instead they need to show self-awareness. Verbal-acts became more Buddhist in nature.

If the performance and power of verbal-acts has become more Buddhist, than so too has the content of the verbal-act. The verbal-acts found in the Pali Canon often refer to or directly include Buddhist ideals. This is most clearly seen in the protective verses (*paritta*) found in the Khuddhakapatha. Aṅgulimāla (M ii 103), for example, references non-harm in his truth-act (*saccakiriyā*). In the truth-acts used in the Cariyāpiṭaka (Cp 9-10), the Dhamma is referenced, in the Ahina-Sutta (A II 72-3) loving-kindness (*mettā*) is spoken about. Change is not made by involving deities, instead it is caused by noting this truth. Truth, as seen in chapter four, can take a number of forms. It can be a personal truth, or relate to a larger truth about the nature of the universe. In either case, the content of verbal-acts reflect a Buddhist worldview. The fact that there are compilations of verbal-acts found within the Pali Canon, such as the Khuddakapāṭha show that verbal-acts are at the heart of early Buddhism and not a later addition.

Another example of verbal-acts being incorporated into the religious landscape of Buddhism can be seen in the use of vows (*patthanā*). The use of vows

(*patthanā*) is not just tolerated in the Pali Canon but they are embraced. The use of vows demonstrates the fact that verbal-acts can be both magical and religious. The use of vows are not just tolerated in the Pali Canon but embraced. They are used for a variety of reasons including better rebirths (D III 207–72, M III 99), to enact revenge (Dhp-a I 45), and to attain religious goals in the future (Dhp-a II 84-85, Dhp-a III 87-95). The use of vows remains bound by the conditions of truth and behaviour. Language is important here, promises and vows are binding. In the Darasaratha Jātaka (JA 123-130) a prince would not renege on a promise made even though circumstances had changed. The use of the spoken word in this manner shows that language is recognised as being important and potent. Vows are used at key moments in the religious development of individuals within the Pali Canon. This can be seen with the vow the bodhisatta made to become a Buddha (Bv II A. 53-58), and the vows made by key disciples of the Buddha to be reborn and learn from a future Buddha. Vows have remained an important part of Buddhist practice, not only in Theravāda Buddhist practice but also Mahāyāna Buddhist practice as well.[33]

It should also be noted that sympathetic magic is present in the verbal-acts found in the Pali Canon. Sympathetic magic is not unique to verbal-acts in Theravāda Buddhism and are also a feature in Vedic traditions (Flood: 1996, p.48). In verbal-acts found in the Vedas small truths can be used to affect large changes. Microcosm changes the macrocosm. This is reversed in the verbal-acts in the Pali Canon. Truths about the nature of reality are used to create change and results for the individual on a small level. References are made to the *Dhamma* or a river flowing into the sea before content of the verbal-act expands on the desired results. Like affects like and thus if one statement is true it follows that the next statement is also true.

Verbal-acts are an important part of Theravāda practice. Not only do they provide a means of generating desired results, they also encourage the individual to live a lifestyle congruent with Theravāda ideals. Whether these acts are magical or

[33] See Mrozik (2004, pp.175-194), and Eckel (1990, pp.61-95).

not is not important to the function they have. What matters is the motivation and action that support these acts. Magic, in a Theravāda context can, in the words of McDaniels (2011, pp.116-7), be good religion.

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Abhidh-av	Abhidhammavatara. Edited by A.P. Buddhadatta, London, PTS, 1915–1928.
Abhidh-s-mhṭ	Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha-mahāṭīkā. Edited by Hammalawa Saddhatissa, Oxford, PTS, 1989
AV	Arthavaveda-Saṃhitā. Edited by Herausgegeben von R. Roth and W.D Whitney, London, 1924
Bh P	Bhāgavata Purāṇa. Edited by Ganesh Vasudeo Tagare, Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1976.
Bv	Buddhavaṃsa and Cariyāpitaka. Edited N.A. Jayawickrama, PTS, 1974.
Cp	Buddhavaṃsa and Cariyāpitaka. Edited N.A. Jayawickrama, PTS, 1974.
Dhp	Dhammapada. Edited by K.R. Norman and O. v. Hinüber, Oxford, PTS, 1994.
Dhp-a	Dhammapadaṭṭhakatha. Edited H.C. Norman, London, PTS, 1906–15.
D	Dīgha-Nikāya , Edited by T.W. Rhys Davids, et al., London, 1890–1911. PTS
Ja	Jātaka. Edited by V. Fausbøll, London, PTS, 1877–97.
Khp	Khuddakapātha. Edited by H. Smith, PTS, 1915.

M	Majjhima-Nikāya. Edited by V. Trenckner and R. Chalmers, PTS, 1888–1902.
Miln	Milindapañha. Edited by V. Trenckner, PTS, London, 1880.
Pv	Petavatthu. Edited by N.A. Jayawickrama, London, PTS, 1970.
Pv-a	Petavatthu-aṭṭhakathā. Edited by E. Hardy, London, PTS, 1894.
R	The Ramayana in Sanskrit, Devanagari and Romanization, from files created by Prof. Muneo Tokunaga of Kyoto and edited by John D. Smith. Online edition viewed 20th August 2019. < http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil.html#Ram>
ṚV	The Hymns of the Ṛg-Veda in the Saṃhitā and Pada Texts, London: Trübner and Co, 1887.
S	Saṃyutta-Nikāya. Edited by L. Feer, London, PTS, 1884–98.
Sn	Suttanipata. Edited by Dines Andersen, and Helmer Smith, London, PTS, 1913.
Sv	Sumaṅgalavilāsinī. Edited by T.W. Rhys Davids, London, PTS, 1886–1932.
Ud	Udana. Edited by P. Steinthal, London, PTS, 1885
Vin	Vinaya. Edited by H. Oldenberg, London 1879–83.
Vism	Visuddhimagga. Edited by C.A.F. Rhys Davids. London, PTS, 1920–21.

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